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NO CHANCE TO PROVE THEMSELVES: THE RIGHTS OF 
MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS UNDER THE AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND STATE LAW 
Dale Margolin• 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores the relationship between state child welfare 
laws that terminate parental rights and the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). The article begins by analyzing the application 
of the ADA to termination of parental rights proceedings against parents 
with mental disabilities. It then surveys state child welfare laws, 
focusing on the treatment of parents under New York State law. The 
article concludes by advocating for a change to reflect the principles of 
the ADA in state laws and in practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"I love mommy. I always want to see her when we go to the agency. " 
This is what my five year-old client, Gaby, 1 told me2 after a one-
hour visit with her mother, Tanya, which took place in the chaotic 
waiting area of their foster care agency. No rooms were available that 
day, so Gaby had to play on her mother's lap until the allotted hour was 
up. Tanya was composed, though she had certainly had her ups-and-
downs as a woman suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Still, she had 
never missed a visit with Gaby in the five years the child was in foster 
care, and had diligently followed all other court orders - to attend 
therapy and parenting classes, and to consistently test negative for drugs. 
She lived independently and had successfully cared for Gaby on the 
sporadic overnight visits she had been granted. 
1 For purposes of preserving attorney-client confidentiality, all client and party 
names have been changed. 
2 I represented Gaby as a law guardian in New York State Family Court. Under 
New York law, the law guardian "help[s] protect [the minor's] interests and 
[expresses his or her] wishes to the court." N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 241 (2007). 
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As Tanya pulled toys and clothing out of a shopping bag for Gaby, 
she asked me about the petition to terminate her parental rights based on 
mental illness, which was pending in New York State Family Court. 
The foster care agency considered it a heartbreaking case because of 
Tanya's compliance with the court orders, her steadfast love for Gaby, 
and their undeniably strong bond. But the agency was going forward 
with the petition so Gaby could be adopted by her current foster mother. 
I didn't want to explain to Tanya3 what I knew would likely happen: her 
rights would be terminated because her mental illness rendered her 
"unable" to care for Gaby. Gaby had told me she wanted to live with her 
foster mother, but had also expressed a strong and consistent desire to 
see Tanya regularly. By the time the case went to trial, I no longer 
represented Gaby and could not express her wishes to the court. But I 
doubt it would have made a difference; Tanya's parental rights could be 
terminated with ease under New York statutes and case law. 
This article examines the relationship between state child welfare 
laws that terminate parental rights and the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). I focus on the treatment of parents who suffer 
from mental illness or mental retardation under New York Social 
Services Law; it is one of many state statutes that, I argue, are in 
violation of the ADA. 
In Section I, I discuss the scope of the ADA, including whether and 
how it can apply to termination of parental rights proceedings (TPRs). 
Section II explores the treatment of mentally disabled parents under state 
child welfare law, focusing on New York, and the relevance of this 
treatment to the ADA. I posit that New York State law and other state 
statutes are discriminatory on their face under the ADA because they 
terminate the rights of mentally disabled parents on the basis of status 
and speculation over future behavior. It is also my contention that New 
York's law is uniquely discriminatory in that mentally disabled parents 
are never entitled to services or a dispositional hearing at the conclusion 
of their TPR trials. A parent in New York State can have her rights 
terminated without a single opportunity to ameliorate her situation, 
flying in the face of the purpose and mandate of the ADA. In Section 
III, I conclude by calling for a change in state laws and practice, 
particularly those of New York, by taking into account how a few states 
have amended their statutes since the passage of the ADA to incorporate 
3 As Gaby's counsel, I would not have advised an adversary; however, I did 
have permission to speak with Tanya from her attorney. 
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this landmark federal legislation into their case law. 
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) AND TERMINATION 
OF PARENT AL RIGHTS PROCEEDINGS (TPRS) 
A. TITLE II OF THE ADA 
The ADA, enacted in 1990 with strong support from a diverse 
coalition in Congress as well as the American public, is civil rights 
legislation intended to remedy discrimination against disabled 
individuals.4 Over 54 million Americans are protected under the ADA,5 
including anyone with a "mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more ... major life activities ... ; a record of such an impairment; or 
being regarded as having such an impairment."6 Mental impairment is 
defined as "[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as mental 
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and 
specific learning disabilities."7 
Prior legislation, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, had 
prohibited discrimination against disabled individuals by governmental 
and private entities who received federal financial assistance.8 Title II of 
the ADA similarly proscribes discrimination on the basis of disability by 
a public entity, which includes (1) any state or local government, and (2) 
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality 
of a state or states or local government.9 The regulations addressing the 
implementation of Title II state that it applies to "all services, programs, 
and activities provided or made available by public entities."10 
4 Kevin L. Cope, Comment, Sutton Misconstrued: Why the ADA Should Now 
Permit Employers to Make Their Employees Disabled, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1753, 
1758 (2004). 
5 See OFFICE ON DISABILITY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADA 
FACT SHEET (2005), http://www.hhs.gov/od/documents/ADAFactSheet.doc; see 
also LITA JANS & SUSAN STODDARD, CHARTBOOK ON WOMEN AND DISABILITY 
IN THE UNITED STATES § 4.2 ( 1991 ), available at 
http://www.infouse.com/disabilitydata/womendisability (including at least 6.9 
million Americans with disabilities between the ages of 18 and 64 who are 
custodial parents). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C) (2007). 
7 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2007). 
8 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (2007). 
9 42 U.S.C. §12131 (l)(A)-(B) (2007). 
10 28 C.F.R. § 35.102 (2007). 
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B. THE APPLICATION OF TITLE II TO TPRS 
Title II does not specifically indicate whether court proceedings, 
including termination of parental rights trials, are "state activity."11 But 
the fact-findings 12 and the purpose statement, which invokes "the sweep 
of congressional authority," 13 indicate that Congress intended the ADA 
to eliminate all forms of state discrimination, with Title II specifically 
targeted to public services (as opposed to Title I, which applies only to 
employment, and Title III, to public facilities). Congress' goal was "to 
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals [and] to ensure that the Federal 
Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards."14 Congress 
also stipulated that the ADA is "a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination." 15 Indeed, the application 
of the ADA to termination of parental rights proceedings was not beyond 
the scope of Congress' findings. 16 
1. Federal Interpretations of Title II 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) considers court actions to be "state 
activity" for purposes of the ADA. The DOJ has specifically prohibited 
discrimination in all state judicial systems receiving federal financial 
assistance. 17 According to the Supreme Court, the DOJ is crucial when 
interpreting Title II: "[b ]ecause the Department [of Justice] is the agency 
directed by Congress to issue regulations implementing Title II ... its 
views warrant respect." 18 
11 42 U.S.C. § 12131 {l)(A)-(B). 
12 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 526 (2004) (discussing that in the 
deliberations that led to the enactment of the ADA, Congress found "hundreds 
of examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities by States and their 
political subdivisions"). 
13 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2007). 
14 § 1210l(b)(2)-(3). 
15 § 1210l(b){l). 
16 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1O1-485, Part 3 at 25 (1990) (House Judiciary 
Committee Report on the ADA observing that "discriminatory policies and 
practices affect people with disabilities in every aspect of their lives," including 
"securing custody of their children"). 
17 28 C.F.R. § 42.503(a)-(f) (2007) (applying to all court systems receiving 
federal financial assistance). 
18 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597-98 (1999). 
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The Supreme Court itself has held that providing the disabled with 
access to courts is a constitutional mandate of Title Il. 19 According to 
the Court, the "unequal treatment of disabled persons in the 
administration of judicial services has a long history,"20 which the ADA 
sought to redress. States must provide a "meaningful opportunity to be 
heard,"21 including reasonable accommodations for paraplegic and 
hearing and visually impaired litigants. Of particular relevance to 
mentally disabled parents, the Court cited the "failure to permit 
testimony of adults with developmental disabilities"22 as one of the 
congressional findings leading to the enactment of the ADA. 
The Supreme Court has not, however, directly addressed whether the 
substance of state court proceedings, or specifically TPRs, constitutes a 
state "activity" or "service."23 But the Court's Title II jurisprudence 
indicates a broad interpretation of "service." Incarceration counts, 
regardless of the fact that prison services are involuntary and not wholly 
for the benefit of the prisoner. 24 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "the fact the [ADA] can 
be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress does not 
demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth. "'25 Federal courts also 
have interpreted Title II broadly, applying it to social services;26 access 
to public areas27 and public meetings;28 arrests;29 education;30 housing;31 
loans;32 and transportation,33 to name a few. Notably, the Ninth Circuit 
19 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 546 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). 
20 Id. at 531 (majority opinion). 
21 Id. at 532. 
22 Id. at 527. 
23 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the applicability of Title II to TPRs. 
Most recently, it denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in the case of In re 
Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (R.I. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1372 (2007). 
24 Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). 
25 Id. at 212 (citing Sedima, S. P.R. L. v. Irnrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985)). 
26 Henrietta v. Bloomberg, 331F.3d261 (2d Cir. 2003). 
27 Tennesee v. Lane, 541 U.S. at 511. 
28 Pascuiti v. N.Y. Yankees, 87 F. Supp. 2d 221, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
29 Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567 (5th Cir. 2002). 
30 Smith v. Univ. of State ofN.Y., 1997 WL 800882 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); Essen v. 
Bd. of Educ. of Ithaca City Sch. Dist. 16 A.D.D. 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1996); Garret 
v. Chi. Reform Bd. ofTrs., 17 A.D.D. 810 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
31 Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 Fed. Appx. 603 (9th Cir. 2004). 
32 Gaona v. Town & Country Credit, 324 F.3d 1050, 1056 (8th Cir. 2003). 
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has applied Title II to parole proceedings,34 which, according to the 
court, exist to protect the public,35 just as TPRs serve to protect 
children.36 In New York, the Second Circuit has held that "programs, 
services, or activities" is a "catch-all phrase that prohibits all 
discrimination by a public entity, regardless of the context."37 
2. State Interpretations of Title II 
In spite of federal guidance and case law, many state courts have 
held that TPRs are not a state activity or service. The courts reason that 
TPRs are about parents' rights and children's best interests; not state 
programs. Appendix A contains a table of state court decisions 
regarding the applicability of the ADA to TPRs and the use of the ADA 
as a defense at TPRs. 
In New York, a trial court held that TPRs are "not services, 
programs, or activities."38 According to the court, "the ADA was 
designed to deal with access to public services and accommodations, 
rather than to alter the rights of parents in state termination of parental 
rights statutes."39 Other states have similarly held that court proceedings 
are not a state activity or service.40 
33 Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004); Bd. ofTrs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 379 (11th Cir. 2001). 
34 Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002). 
35 Id. at 896-99. 
36 See, e.g., New York's TPR statute, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b, which 
provides that "it is the intent of the legislature . . . to provide procedures ... 
where positive ... parent-child relationships no longer exist, furthering the best 
interests, needs, and rights of the child by terminating parental rights." See also 
infra note 69. 
37 Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
38 In re La' Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d 898, 909. (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2002). 
39 Id. 
40 See, e.g., In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202 (Supp. Ct. R.I. 2006); In re Ronald 
Dietrich, 2006 WL 2355135 (Mich. App.); In re Ivan M. 2006 WL 1487173 
(Cal.App. 4 Dist.); Adoption of Terrence, 787 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2003); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 (Conn. App. 1999); State ex rel. 
B.K.F., 704 So.2d 314, 317 (La. App. 1997); In re B.S., Juvenile, 693 A.2d 716, 
720-721 (Vt. 1997). 
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However, some courts have found the ADA applicable to TPRs. In 
Matter of MH. and G.H.,41 the Supreme Court of Montana entertained 
the claim of the respondent father that he suffered from a mental 
impairment which was not reasonably accommodated under the ADA; 
however, the court held that the father would need assistance '"every 
minute' ... in order to get. .. to a point at which he would be a minimally 
adequate parent," and that this would be a fundamental alteration in state 
services, which is not required by the ADA.42 Similarly, in the Interest 
of K.K., 43 the Court of Appeals of Iowa held that the state complied with 
the ADA in the way it treated a mother with a substance abuse 
problem.44 According to the Alaska Supreme Court, an ADA violation 
could bar a showing of "reasonable efforts" as necessary before 
termination. 45 
Other courts have acknowledged the applicability of the ADA to 
TPRs, despite procedural problems. In In re K.M,46 the Court of 
Appeals of Kansas held that the mother's ADA claim was moot, but then 
went on to note that she failed to make a prima facie ADA case, because 
she did not provide evidence that she was disabled. Likewise, in In re 
T.M,47 the Court of Appeals of Iowa held that the mentally retarded 
mother could argue that the state's treatment of her was discriminatory 
under the ADA at a TPR, but such a claim would have to be made first at 
a removal or review hearing, or when services were offered; a similar 
41 143 P.3d 103, 107 (Mont. 2006). 
42 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007). 
43 No. 4-173/04-0166, 2004 LEXIS 556, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2004), 
ajf'd 682 N.W.2d 83 (2004). 
44 Washington State also has applied the ADA to TPR proceedings, though no 
actual violations have been found. See, e.g., In re Dependency of C.C., No. 
40888-7-1, 1999 WL 106824, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1999); In re 
Welfare of A.J.R. 896 P.2d 1298, 1302 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995). 
45 J.H. v. State Dep't of Health & Social Services, 30 P.3d 79, 86 n.11 (Alaska 
2001) (assuming, arguendo, that the ADA applies to TPR proceedings, but 
holding that "AS 47.10.086(a)'s requirement that the department make 
reasonable efforts to provide [respondent] with family support services appears 
to be essentially identical to the ADA's reasonable accommodation 
requirement"); In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 563, 570 (Mich. App. 2000) (holding 
same, while simultaneously finding that a parent may not raise the ADA as a 
defense to a TPR). 
46 131P.3d1281, 1285 (Kan. App. 2006). 
47 715 N.W.2d 771 (Iowa Ct. App. 2006). 
120 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law [Vol. 15:1 
finding was made in In re Prentiss Ratliff for a mentally ill mother who 
first raised the ADA on appeal of a TPR.48 
Several courts have specifically held that states are obligated under 
the ADA to be non-discriminatory in their treatment of respondent 
parents, even if the ADA does not directly apply to TPRs. In In re 
Aundre Murphy,49 the Michigan Court of Appeals stated, "the ADA does 
require ... the ... Agency to make reasonable accommodations for those 
individuals with disabilities so that all persons may receive the benefits 
of public programs and services." The court went on to note that the 
ADA is not a defense to a TPR; however, it analyzed the record to see 
whether the mentally disabled father was properly accommodated.50 In 
Roby v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 51 the Arkansas Court of 
Appeals also acknowledged that the ADA is relevant at a TPR by noting 
that the state provided "reasonable accommodations in accordance with 
the ADA" to a mentally ill parent. 
Even some courts which wholly refuse to entertain ADA claims 
have acknowledged that the services involved in TPRs must be non-
discriminatory. The Vermont Supreme Court specifically stated that by 
not entertaining an ADA claim it did "not mean to suggest that parents 
lack any remedy for [the agency's] alleged violations of the ADA. We 
hope that the effect of this decision is to encourage parents and other 
recipients of [agency] services to raise complaints about services 
vigorously and in a timely fashion."52 Numerous other states have held 
that the ADA applies to reunification services,53 but that parents can only 
litigate ADA claims in federal court or following other procedures under 
the ADA. 54 
48 No. 04AP-803, 2005 WL 675798, at *8 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2005). See 
also In re John D., 934 P.2d 308, 313-15 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
"Section 12132 of the ADA [applies] in situations where a state has a statutory 
duty or otherwise undertakes to assist a person," including TPRs, but finding 
that section inapplicable because the ground for TPR was abandonment and the 
state did not have a statutory obligation to provide services to any parent in an 
abandonment case). 
49 No. 250791, 2004 WL 895950, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. April 27, 2004). 
50 Id. 
51 No. CA 06-626, 2006 WL 3425011, at *3 (Ark. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2006). 
52 In re B.S., Juvenile, 693 A.2d 716, 722-23 (Vt. 1997). 
53 See definition infra note 120. 
54 See In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 291 (Haw. 2002); In re Chance Jahmel B., 723 
N.Y.S.2d 634, 640 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001); Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 
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Likewise, Indiana held that if services are provided, they must be 
non-discriminatory.55 "When an agency opts to provide services to assist 
parents in improving parental skills, the provision of those services must 
be in compliance with the ADA."56 The court found, however, that an 
ADA violation was not a defense to a TPR, solely because all parents 
were treated the same way under Indiana law.57 Regardless of disability, 
no parent in Indiana was entitled to services before a TPR at the time of 
this ruling. 58 
Overall, courts are reluctant to apply the ADA to TPRs outright, but 
many acknowledge its principles of equitable treatment in holdings and 
in dicta. 
3. An Alternative Interpretation of the ADA 's Application to TPR 
Proceedings 
Even if the general consensus of state courts is that a TPR is not a 
. state activity or service, it can be argued that the ADA still applies to the 
proceeding because it involves an examination of other services that are 
administered by the state. Indeed, many courts have alluded to this 
interpretation.59 As noted above, social services fall under the umbrella 
of Title II, including those administered through contract agencies (all 
state, county, municipal and contract agencies will be referred to herein 
as "agencies"); Title II regulations prohibit discrimination by the state 
either directly or "through contractual, licensing, or other 
120, 126-127 (Mass. 2001); In re Anthony P., 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 423, 425-426 
(Cal. App. 2000); In re Harmon, No. 00 CA 2693, 2000 WL 1424822, at *12 
(Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 25, 2000); In re Antony B., 735 A.2d 893, 899 n.9 (Conn. 
App. 1999); In re AP., 728 A.2d 375, 379 (Pa. Super. 1999); In re B.S., 693 
A.2d at 722; In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). But 
see infra note 81. 
55 In re E.E., 736 N.E.2d 791, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
56 Id. at 796. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 See, e.g., J.H. v. State, 30 P.3d 79; Roby, 2006 WL 3425011; In re E.E., 736 
N.E.2d 791; In re K.K., 682 N.W.2d 83; In re T.M., 715 N.W.2d 771; In re 
K.M., 131P.3d1281; In re Murphy, 2004 WL 895950; In re Terry, 610 N.W.2d 
563; In re MH., 143 P.3d 103; In re John D., 934 P.2d 308; In re Ratliff, 2005 
WL 675798; In re Welfare of A.JR., 896 P.2d 1298; In re Dependency of C.C., 
1999 WL 106824. 
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arrangements."60 Services offered to parents are an inherent part of the 
evidence used by both sides in a TPR. 61 In order to make a 
determination, the court looks at the state's actions with regard to the 
parent and whether the parent complied with the service plan; even in a 
mental disability case, where in certain situations service plans are not 
mandated, some contact with the parent will have to be made and, later, 
examined at trial. 
The ADA prohibits one public entity from perpetuating another 
public entity's discrimination if "both entities are subject to common 
administrative control or are agencies of the same State."62 State and 
contract agencies, as well as family and juvenile courts, are both under 
the jurisdiction of state laws63 (and are both subject to Title II64). 
Therefore, if an agency has discriminated against a parent by not making 
appropriate contact with him or her, a family court cannot perpetuate this 
lack of action by admitting the agency's evidence without allowing the 
parent to challenge it; one such way is to argue that the evidence violates 
the ADA. 
C. THE ADA AS A DEFENSE AT TPR PROCEEDINGS 
Even if a state acknowledges that Title II applies to a TPR, it still has 
been difficult for parents actually to raise the ADA as a defense to the 
termination of their rights. The ADA applies to TPRs because of the 
breadth of Title II and because a failure to provide appropriate services is 
an attack on the evidence (such as testimony and records) the state uses 
to prove the termination. 
There are, however, other challenges to raising the ADA defense at a 
TPR. State and contract agencies argue that state law, not the ADA, 
60 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l) (2007). 
61 As acknowledged by the Alaska Supreme Court, J.H. v. State Dep 't, 30 P.3d 
at 86 n.11. 
62 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3)(iii) (2007). 
63 See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney 2007); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
(West 2007). 
64 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l) (2007) (prohibiting a public entity from 
discriminating either directly or "through contractual, licensing, or other 
arrangements"). 
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governs their conduct.65 Some courts have been favorable to this 
argument: "Congress did not intend to change the obligations imposed 
by unrelated statutes."66 In Vermont, the Supreme Court went further, 
holding that the limited jurisdiction of the juvenile court prohibits it from 
entertaining "side issues that do not directly concern the status of the 
juvenile before it."67 The court feared that an "open-ended inquiry into 
how the parents might respond to alternative ... services" would "ignore 
the needs of the child and divert the attention of the court to disputes 
between [social services] and the parents."68 As a Florida Court of 
Appeals stated, "dependency proceedings are held for the benefit of the 
child, not the parent. "69 
But, as contended, the TPR and the ADA are inherently related: the 
TPR involves an examination of both a person's disability and the state's 
implementation of services.7° Furthermore, contrary to the fears of some 
state courts, allowing a parent to assert a violation of the ADA does not 
mean that that the child's rights will be compromised.71 The child is 
always the focus of a family court proceeding, even when the court is 
examining a potential violation of the ADA.72 In virtually every state, 
the "best interest" of the child is considered during the TPR. 73 
Furthermore, a parent's evidentiary attack should not be viewed as 
necessarily contrary to the interests and rights of a child; if a parent has 
been discriminated against, and the parent-child relationship is severed, 
in part or in whole, because of this discriminatory treatment, the 
65 See, e.g., M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 750 So.2d 705 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2000); In re B.S., 693 A.2d 716 (Vt. 1997); In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d 
243 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
66 In re Torrance P., 522 N.W.2d at 246. 
67 In re B.S., 693 A.2d at 721. 
68 Id. 
69 MC. v. Dep 't of Children & Families, 750 So.2d at 706. 
70 See supra text accompanying note 59. 
71 The purpose of child protection statutes is to protect the safety and interests of 
children. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1011 (McKinney 2007) ("This article 
is designed to establish procedures to help protect children from injury or 
mistreatment and to help safeguard their physical, mental, and emotional well-
being."); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-800 (2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 6302 (2007). 
72 See supra note 69. 
73 See Appendix D. 
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severance has drastic, 74 and potentially harmful, 75 consequences for the 
child. 
Moreover, Title II would have no purpose if states could fail to 
accommodate disabled people as long as they did so through "unrelated" 
statutes. Most statutes involving state services, programs, and activities 
were in place long before the ADA and are not specifically related to the 
disabled. 76 But they are precisely that which Congress intended to target 
in invoking its "sweep"; 77 if states could argue that their laws were 
"unrelated," Congress would have had no reason to enact Title II. 
Rather, courts have appropriately found that Title II is significant in 
examining these services, programs, and activities.78 
In addition, agencies have argued that the ADA cannot be raised at 
the TPR because denial of a TPR is not an appropriate remedy for a 
violation of the ADA. According to a New York court, nothing in the 
ADA suggests that denial of a TPR is a remedy under the Act, though a 
respondent might be able to sue for monetary damages in federal court.79 
This view has been reiterated by numerous courts,80 even though at least 
74 As long as the child welfare agency is involved (which will usually be for at 
least a year, while the child awaits adoption, see infra note 159), the child will 
not be allowed any contact with the parent. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b 
(permitting courts to terminate parental rights, after which the biological parent-
child relationship has no legal meaning); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089(a)(l) 
(McKinney 2007) (providing that a parent whose rights have been terminated 
will not be notified of permanency hearings); In re April C., 31 A.D.3d 1200 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (finding that respondent lacked to standing to challenge 
permanency hearing orders because her parental rights had been terminated). 
75 See infra notes 316-22. 
76 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65000 (2007); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 225 
(McKinney 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6086 (2007). 
77 See supra text accompanying note 13. 
78 See, e.g., Innovative Health Sys. Inc. v. City of White Plains, 117 F.3d 37 (2d 
Cir. 1997). 
79 In re La' Asia S., 739 N.Y.S.2d at 909. 
80 See, e.g., In re Brendan C., 874 A.2d 826, 836 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); In re 
E.T.C., 141 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); In re Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 291-93 
(Haw. 2002); Adoption of Gregory, 747 N.E.2d 120, 125 (Mass. 2001); In re 
Kassandra T., No. 01-1477, 2001 WL 1243364, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 
2001). 
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one federal district court has held that it cannot hear a TPR-related ADA 
claim, so long as there is a pending state proceeding.81 
This reasoning is flawed. First of all, when a parent raises the ADA 
at a TPR, she is not attempting to litigate the violation in family court, or 
claiming that a dismissal of the TPR is a remedy. Instead, she is 
attacking the agency's evidence and its presumption that it has treated 
her fairly and in accordance with the law. If she has been discriminated 
against, the TPR should be rejected because of flawed evidence, not 
because of an ADA violation per se. 
Moreover, as established above, Congress intended the ADA to be 
broad. Legislators were strongly influenced82 by the Supreme Court's 
finding in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline that "society's 
accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as 
handicapping as ... physical limitations."83 There is no evidence that 
Congress had a different intent from what the plain language stemming 
from these findings indicates. 84 
Furthermore, as discussed, the Supreme Court promoted the scope of 
the ADA (applying it to prison services) by holding that Title H's 
ambiguity "demonstrates breadth."85 Federal cases such as Innovative 
Health Systems, Inc. v. City of White Plains86 and Civic Association of 
the Deaf v. Giuliam.s7 have reiterated that, as a remedial statute, the ADA 
must be broadly construed or the congressional purpose will be 
81 McLeod v. State Dep't of Human Servs., No. 99-233-P-H, 1999 WL 
33117123, at *l (D. Me. Nov. 2, 1999) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss 
on grounds that "[a] federal court, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, must 
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction 'so long as there is ( 1) 
an ongoing state judicial proceeding ... that (2) implicates an important state 
interest, and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the 
claims advanced in [her] federal lawsuit"'). 
82 See Michael L. Perlin, "What's Good is Bad, What's Bad is Good, You'll 
Find out When You Reach the Top, You 're on the Bottom": Are the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. L.C.) Anything More than "Idiot Wind!'', 
35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 242 (2002). 
83 Arline, 480 U.S. at 284. 
84 See supra notes 13-17. 
85 Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 212. 
86 Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d 37. 
87 Civic Ass'n of the DeafofN.Y. City v. Giuliani, 970 F. Supp 352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
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frustrated. 88 As the Second Circuit stated, "Title II's enforcement 
provision extends relief to 'any person alleging discrimination on the 
basis of disability. "'89 There is nothing in the statute to indicate that it is 
inappropriate for a parent to raise a violation of the ADA at a state TPR 
trial. 
Another argument agencies make is that alleged ADA violations 
must be raised before TPRs, either at the dispositional hearing following 
the initial finding of child abuse or neglect, or at a permanency hearing 
or a service plan review while the child is in foster care.9° Courts have 
held that parents must identify why the agency's service plan is 
inappropriate and what kinds of services they should be receiving.91 
According to a Massachusetts court, "a parent who believes that the 
department is not reasonably accommodating her disability 'should 
claim a violation ... either when the ... plan is adopted, when [she] 
receives those services, or shortly thereafter. "'92 A New York court 
similarly held that the ADA may "provide a sound argument at a 
permanency hearing for the development of an individualized service 
plan including reasonable accommodations."93 
However, as anyone who has practiced in this field knows, family 
court cases do not always proceed so smoothly. Courts in New York, for 
example, frequently fail to order concrete service plans at the 
dispositional hearings following neglect and abuse fact-finding trials.94 
88 See id. at 361. 
89 Innovative Health Sys., 117 F.3d at 47. 
90 These terms are used in New York State. The disposition is the hearing 
immediately following a fact-finding for neglect or abuse and determines the 
child's best interest and the parent's service plan, N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1045; 
the permanency hearing takes places within eight months after the child was 
first removed and placed in foster care, and every six months thereafter, § 1089; 
a service plan review is an out of court meeting with the parents, child, and 
agency which also takes place every six months, N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 409-
e(2)-(3) (2006). All states have hearings and meetings after the initial fact-
finding, though different states use different terminology. See statutes cited in 
Appendix B. 
91 Terrence, 787 N.E.2d at 577-78; In re M.C., Jr. D.C., N.C., No. 02-0860, 
2002 WL 1758359, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 31, 2002). 
92 Terrence, 787 N.E.2d at 577-78. 
93 In re Chance Jahmel B., 723 N.Y.S.2d at 640. 
94 See In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005, 1006 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (stating 
that respondent mother "would be required to demonstrate her ability to provide 
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At the post neglect-finding disposition against Tanya (the respondent 
mother of the case described in the Introduction), the court only 
stipulated that she attend biweekly therapy, maintain sobriety, and secure 
housing, and that the agency perform random urine analysis on her. 
These stipulations are identical to those made for non-disabled parents in 
the majority of abuse and neglect proceedings in New York.95 The court 
did not say how progress was to be measured in therapy and did not 
order Tanya to take medication or to comply with programs specific to 
individuals, or to parents, with schizophrenia.96 This omission is 
common for dispositional orders following abuse and neglect findings.97 
The court also made no mention of alcohol counseling, even though the 
agency indicated a concern over Tanya's alcohol use, which further 
illustrates the ways in which dispositional orders often fail to be 
holistic.98 
a safe and adequate home environment for the child before the child was 
returned to her care and custody"). 
95 See In re Allen T. and Noah T., 801 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005) 
(dispositional order for non-disabled parent was to: 1) submit to an evaluation 
for drug/alcohol abuse counseling and to follow the recommendation of the 
evaluators, 2) submit to a psychological evaluation and to follow the 
recommendation of the evaluator, and 3) obtain housing); In re Brandon 00., 
304 A.D.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (non-disabled respondent to participate 
in mental health counseling, complete a substance abuse treatment program, 
refrain from using illegal drugs and alcohol, and complete a protective parenting 
class); In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (DSS service 
plan for non-disabled incarcerated mother was to attend drug and alcohol 
counseling and provide a safe and adequate home for the child). See also In re 
Clarence Michael W., 33 A.D.3d 485 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Octavia 
Lorraine 0., 34 A.D.3d 258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Emma L., 35 A.D.3d 
250 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Amani T., 33 A.D.3d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2006); In re Alec B., 34 A.D.3d 1110 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Edward 
GG., 35 A.D.3d 1144 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Dessa F., 35 A.D.3d 1096 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Brian C., 31 A.D.3d 1124 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); 
In re Jose R., 32 A.D.3d 1284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Raena 0., 31 
A.D.3d 946 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
96 Parenting classes for individuals with mental illnesses are offered in New 
York City. The Brooklyn Borough of Community Service provides homemaker 
services to parents with disabilities that focus on managing the household and 
parenting skills. Posting of adult services, 
http://www.bbcs.org/programs.php#adult (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). 
97 See, e.g., In re Brandon 0., 304 A.D.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003). 
98 See, e.g., In re Latasha F., 251A.D.2d1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
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The argument that a parent must raise an ADA violation prior to the 
TPR trial is also problematic in that, even if a court's orders at 
disposition are characterized as the "service plan," a parent and her 
counsel cannot know how the agency will accommodate her after the 
plan has commenced.99 In Tanya's case, the agency did not comply with 
its plan: although it performed the drug tests and made a referral for 
parenting classes, it failed to provide any meaningful assistance with 
housing. Such assistance was crucial, as Tanya was living intermittently 
with her brother, but the court made it clear that it would not discharge 
Gaby to the brother's home. The caseworker never referred Tanya for 
public housing or discussed with her the option of moving to a 
residential facility for a period of time in order to become stable. The 
caseworker also never explored the possibility of Gaby living with her 
mother in an assisted facility, even though an assisted living situation 
can be a viable reunification plan for parents with mental disabilities and 
would promote the ADA's objective of integration into the 
community. 10° Furthermore, homelessness, while extremely difficult for 
anyone, can exacerbate the symptoms of a person suffering from 
schizophrenia. 101 Thus, in failing to explore housing possibilities, the 
caseworker likely perpetuated the problems that necessitated removing 
99 See Jn re Allen T. and Noah T., 801 N.Y.S.2d 776 (finding that agency failed 
to follow-up appropriately with dispositional orders, while respondent did 
"virtually everything" to comply); In re Latasha F., 251 A.D.2d 1005 (finding 
that agency failed to advise incarcerated respondent, who had complied with 
services and visitation, that her plan for the care and return of her child was 
unacceptable, and did not assist her in formulating a new plan before filing a 
TPR). 
100 See L.C., 527 U.S. 581; Henrietta, 331 F.3d 261; Helen L. v. Didario, 46 
F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussing intensive case management). Possible 
facilities in New York City include: Center for Urban Community Services -
posting of vacancies available through the Center for Urban Community 
Services, http://www.cucs.org (last visited Nov. 6, 2007); Unique People, 
posting of vacancies available through Unique People, http://www.forhome.org 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007); Women In Need, posting of vacancies available 
through Women In Need, http://www.women-in-need.org/ (last visited Nov. 6, 
2007). 
101 For studies examining the relationship between life stressors and 
schizophrenic symptoms, see Ross M.G. Norman & Ashok K. Malla, Stressful 
Life Events and Schizophrenia I: A Review of the Research, 162 BRIT. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 161-166 (1993); Joseph Ventura et al., A Prospective Study of 
Stressful Life Events and Schizophrenic Relapse, 98 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 
407-411 (1989). 
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Gaby from Tanya's care. Tanya's transient home situation is common 
among mentally disabled parents, who require accommodation with 
respect to housing. 102 
Moreover, the caseworker failed to follow-up with Tanya's therapist 
about the appropriateness of her treatment and strategies for fostering 
reunification, including options such as in-home services. 103 Lastly, the 
caseworker did not offer job assistance and/or referrals for educational 
opportunities. Tanya had held several clerical jobs, but was not 
employed during the time of the child protective proceedings. She told 
the caseworker that she enjoyed working, and employment or classes 
may have stabilized her. 104 Indeed, throughout most of the time Gaby 
was in foster care (close to five years), Tanya was on her own, without 
help from the agency. And because the TPR that emanated from the 
original case was based on mental illness, in the end it did not matter that 
she had complied with all of the dispositional orders; at the TPR, the 
agency only had to prove, through the testimony of a court-appointed 
psychiatrist, that Tanya was incapable of providing adequate care for 
Gaby now and in the foreseeable future. 105 
A lack of counsel at permanency hearings in New York and around 
the country also inhibits raising ADA claims. In New York, most 
respondent parents were unrepresented at permanency hearings prior to 
legislation enacted in 2004.106 Because a TPR fact-finding is likely to 
102 JOANNE NICHOLSON ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES FOR PARENTS WITH MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND THEIR FAMILIES 14 (Center for Mental Health Services Research, 
Department of Psychiatry University of Massachusetts Medical School 2001 ). 
103 Services such as homemaker services can be provided to prevent foster care 
or reunify families. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(5) (2007). 
104 See Gary R. Bond et al., Does Competitive Employment Improve 
Nonvocational Outcomes for People with Severe Mental Illness?, 69 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 497-99 (2001). 
IOS N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 384-b(4)(c), 6(e) (McKinney 2007). 
106 According to N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACT § 262 (McKinney 2006), respondent 
parents are entitled to representation at all child protective proceedings. 
However, prior to a law taking effect in 2004 which increased the rate-of-pay 
for court appointed lawyers (Act effective Jan. 1, 2004, ch. 62, pt. J, sec. 5, 
2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws as applied to N.Y. JUD LAW§ 35 (McKinney 2007) and 
N.Y. COUNTY LAW§ 722(b), (c), (t) (McKinney 2007); see also infra note 260), 
there was a shortage of court appointed attorneys in New York. See JULIA 
VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT: COURT USER 
PERSPECTIVES 12-16 (Vera Institute of Justice 2000), available at 
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take place years after a child has entered foster care, 107 a substantial 
portion of recent and pending TPRs have a history of permanency 
hearings in which the parents lacked representation. 108 Furthermore, 
prior to 2004, even if a parent had a lawyer at one permanency hearing, 
she was not necessarily represented by the same person at the next 
hearing, or at the TPR. 109 In Tanya's case, she did not have 
representation at any of the permanency hearings. Without a lawyer, 
Tanya could not have been expected to know that she was entitled to 
reasonably accommodated services under the ADA, and that the services 
she was receiving were not appropriate. Like most respondent parents, 
her goal was to follow the agency's plan without objection, because that 
is the only path to reunification. At least one other state has 
acknowledged the importance of counsel in this regard: "[w]hile it could 
be argued that Mother was hampered in asking for assistance ... we note 
that Mother was represented by counsel, who could have notified DHS 
on [her] behalf. "110 
http://www.vera.org/publication_pdf/nyfamilycourt.pdf; KLAUS EPPLER ET AL., 
REPORT OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION FIRST DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON 
REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR: CRISIS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENT A T!ON OF THE 
POOR (2001), available at http://nysl.nysed.gov/Archimages/4826.PDF; Somini 
Sengupta, Lack of Lawyers Crippling Family Court, Report Says, N.Y. Times, 
May 14, 2000, § 1, at 35. Because of this shortage, respondent parents did not 
retain their appointed counsel from the original neglect proceedings, and were 
rarely, if ever, notified of their right to an attorney at permanency hearings. It 
was unusual for a parent to have representation at permanency hearings. JULIA 
VITULLO-MARTIN & BRIAN MAXEY, NEW YORK FAMILY COURT: COURT USER 
PERSPECTIVES 15 (Vera Institute of Justice 2000), available at 
http://www.vera.org/pub lication _pdf/nyfamilycourt. pdf. 
107 The reasons for this are threefold: the goal upon entering foster care is almost 
always reunification (infra notes 127- 28); the agency ordinarily will not file a 
petition for TPR until the child has been in care at least 15 months (infra note 
112); and the family court calendar is extremely backlogged (see Vitullo-
Martin, supra note 106; Eppler, supra note 106; Sengupta, supra note 106; infra 
note 159 (the average length of time in foster care in New York, as elsewhere, is 
58 months)). 
108 See, e.g., In re Destiny CC., 40 A.D.3d 1167 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); In re 
Dessa F., 35 A.D.3d 1096 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Vivian 00., 34 A.D.3d 
1111 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Termination of Parental Rights Proceeding 
Lakeside Family and Children's Service v. Conchita J., 814 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 2005); In re W.N., 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005); In re 
Edward V.V., 814 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005). 
109 Vitullo-Marten, supra note 106. 
110 In re Jane Doe, 60 P.3d 285, 294 (Haw. 2002). 
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Furthermore, under the federal 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act 
(ASFA), 111 even if a parent raises an ADA violation at a permanency 
hearing, in most states, a TPR still could be filed if her child has been in 
foster care for 15 of the previous 22 months. 112 Thus, a permanency 
hearing should not be the only time that courts entertain the ADA. 
A parent's claim that an agency violated the ADA is relevant at the 
TPR because the ADA prohibits discrimination by the state. The 
parent's objection is with the manner in which the state has treated her 
with respect to the evidence and the decision at the TPR. The TPR may 
be the only feasible time for her to raise such an objection. She is asking 
that the TPR be denied because it is based on inadequate evidence, and 
not because this is a "remedy" for the state's violation of the ADA. A 
remedy for the state's violation of her rights and the rights of all disabled 
respondent parents can be litigated separately in federal court. 
Although New York and other states have been reluctant to allow 
parents to raise ADA violations at TPRs, the reasoning of these courts is 
in conflict with the legislative intent and the plain language of the ADA. 
States should follow the Supreme Court and federal courts' ~road 
interpretation of Title II; parents should not be barred from asserting that 
the ADA guarantees certain rights, and that any violation of these rights 
is relevant in deciding whether to grant the TPR. 
D. BRINGING AN ADA-TPR CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT 
1. Prima Facie Case 
A parent can file an ADA case in federal court, raising a claim of 
discrimination based on disability at any time during her interaction with 
an agency - after the initial neglect or abuse filing; between permanency 
hearings; while a TPR is pending; after a state court has terminated 
rights, regardless of whether the ADA was raised; or pending an appeal 
of the TPR - but the focus here is a potential ADA claim after a TPR. 113 
111 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified as amendments to 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
112 42 U.S.C. § 675(5). ASFA's 15 out of22 month timeline has been adopted in 
almost every state, infra note 312. 
113 State and federal courts appear to have concurrent jurisdiction over matters 
that relate to parental rights and the ADA. See Theresa Glennon, Lawyering for 
the Mentally Ill: Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental 
Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & C!v. RTS. L. REv. 273, 
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The parent will have to prove three things: that the agency is a public 
entity; that she is a qualified individual with a disability; and that she has 
been subjected to discrimination on the basis of this disability. 114 
The first prong is easy. As discussed, any state or municipal agency, 
including a contract private agency, is a public entity. 115 To fulfill the 
second prong, a parent must demonstrate that she has a "mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities ... ; 
or a record of such impairment; or of being regarded as having such an 
impairment."116 The first definition may be difficult for a parent to 
prove if her mental illness is managed; 117 however, mental disability 
claims in other contexts have survived this test. 118 It probably is not in a 
parent's interest to claim that parenting is a life activity substantially 
limited by her mental disability, because this might undercut her 
argument that she is a fit parent or fit for services (even if this should be 
irrelevant, as discussed below). A parent also can demonstrate a record 
of impairment or of being regarded as having an impairment by 
admitting into evidence the initial allegations, the finding, or the 
subsequent case record. 119 
300 (2003); see also Mclnnes-Mesnor v. Maine Medical Center, 211 F. Supp. 
2d 256, 263 (D. Me. 2002), aff'd 319 F.3d 63 (I st Cir. 2003); Black v. Dep't of 
Mental Health, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39, 42 n.4 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 2000); but see 
McLeod v. State of Maine Dep't of Human Servs., No. 99-233-P-H, 1999 WL 
33117123 at *2 (D. Me. Nov. 2, 1999). 
114 See Cary LaCheen, Using Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act on 
Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 1, 39-
47 (2001). 
115 See 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(l). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(C). 
117 See Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, P.C., 135 F.3d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding 
no substantial limitation where impairment limited plaintiffs ability "only 
periodically"); Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 315-317 (6th Cir. 
2001) (periodic mental illness with successful treatment is not disability). 
118 Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 113 F. Supp. 2d 770, 773 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(prima facie case made out for plaintiff by a showing that "he or she (1) has a 
disability (2) is a qualified individual and (3) has suffered an adverse 
employment action because of that disability"); Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 
F.3d 1017, 1027-28 (8th Cir. 1999) (summary judgment denied to defendant 
where plaintiff was a medical student and suffered from Obsessive Compulsive 
Disorder). 
119 See, e.g., case cited supra note 41; cases cited infra note 227. 
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In addition, the second prong of the prima facie case requires that the 
parent prove she is "eligible" for a benefit offered by the state. The 
benefit pertaining to TPRs is reunification services. 120 Although only a 
few ADA-TPR cases have been litigated in federal court, mentally 
disabled parents have had difficulty demonstrating that they are eligible 
for reunification services under the ADA. 121 States have argued that 
certain parents are not "qualified" to be parents, and therefore not 
entitled to these services. 122 One district court dismissed a mentally ill 
parent's ADA claim, after a New York family court had made a neglect 
finding and granted a termination of parental rights, because "the Family 
Court has ruled, and it is not within the authority of this Court to 
question that ruling, that plaintiff is not qualified to act as a parent to her 
children."123 Apparently, the federal court was reluctant to question the 
substance of the family court's rulings, even if they were inherently 
intertwined with the ADA claim. 124 
Even aside from the relationship between TPRs and the ADA, the 
claim that certain parents are not "qualified" under the ADA fails 
because all states provide preventive125 and/or reunification126 services to 
120 Reunification services are provided and/or coordinated by the agency and 
facilitate the reunification of a family when a child has been placed in foster 
care. They can include parenting classes, individual and/or family therapy, 
education, employment and housing assistance, and programs addressing 
domestic violence, substance abuse, anger management, etc. as appropriate. See, 
e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 1055(c), 1089(d)(2)(viii)(F) (2007); S.C. CODE 
ANNOT. § 20-7-764(B)(3) (2006); see also Appendix B. 
121 McLeod, 1999 WL 33117123 at *1-2 (granting defendant's motion to 
dismiss on grounds that a federal court, pursuant to the Younger doctrine, "must 
abstain from hearing a case over which it has jurisdiction so long as there is (1) 
an ongoing state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates an important state 
interest and (3) provides an adequate opportunity for the plaintiff to raise the 
claims advanced in [her] federal lawsuit"); Morrison v. Comrn'r of Special 
Servs., No. CV 94-5796 RID, 1996 WL 684426 (E.D.N.Y. Nov., 18, 1996); 
Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000). 
122 Morrison, 1996 WL 684426, at *4. 
123 Id. 
124 See supra text accompanying note 59. 
125 Preventive services are designed to avoid removing the child from his home 
and placing him in state custody. New York's Social Services Law defines such 
services as "supportive and rehabilitative services provided ... to children and 
their families for the purpose of: averting an impairment or disruption of a 
family which will or could result in the placement of a child in foster care; 
enabling a child who has been placed in foster care to return to his family at an 
134 Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law (Vol. 15:1 
parents, at some stage during the course of a child protective case. 127 
States provide these services not to bolster already "qualified" parents, 
but because there is a state and national interest in preserving families, 
particularly ones at risk, 128 and because biological parents have certain 
fundamental rights. 129 The Supreme Court has long held that parenting 
earlier time than would otherwise be possible; or reducing the likelihood that a 
child who has been discharged from foster care would return to such care." 
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 409 (McKinney 2003). See also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
18B, § 3(A)(l) (2002); FLA. STAT. § 39.402(7) (West Supp. 2007); CAL. WELF. 
& INST. CODE § 11400(1) (West 2001) (amended 2007). 
126 Supra notes 120 and 125. 
127 Federal legislation, such as AACWA and ASFA, specifically provide that 
reasonable efforts must be made before removing children from their biological 
parents. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-272, § 47l(a)(15)(A), 94 Stat. 501, 503; Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111Stat.2116, 2116 §101(a)(15)(B)(i). Reasonable 
efforts must also be made after a child has been removed in order to reunify the 
family. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act § 471(a)(15)(B); 
Adoption and Safe Families Act §10l(a)(15)(B)(ii). New York's child 
protective statutes, like all states', provide the same. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§ 1015-a (McKinney 1999); § 1022(a)(iii)-(iv), (c) (McKinney Supp. 2007); 
§ 1027(b)(i) (McKinney Supp. 2007); § 1089(d)(2)(viii)(F) (McKinney Supp. 
2007); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 409 (McKinney 2003). But see Appendix A for 
New York and other state statutes under which mentally disabled parents are not 
always entitled to services after a child has been removed. 
128 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW. § 384-b(l)(a)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 2007) 
("the state's first obligation is to help the family with services to prevent its 
break-up or reunite it ifthe child has already left home"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
7-764(B)(l)(b) (West. Supp. 2006) ("[t]he [child protection] plan must be 
oriented to correcting [the] problems and circumstances [of the family] in the 
shortest possible time in order to expedite the child's return to the home"); PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (West 2001) (a purpose of child protective law is to 
"stabilize and protect the integrity of family life."). Also, New York, like all 
other states, puts reunification as the automatic goal upon the initial filing of a 
child protective case. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1015-a; § 1022(a)(iii)-(iv), (c); 
§ 1027(b)(i); § 1089(c)(4)(i). 
129 S~e Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 
7 45 ( 1982). According to the Santosky Court, "the fundamental liberty interest 
of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not 
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost 
temporary custody of their child to the state." Id. at 753. See also Lassiter v. 
Dep't of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("A parent's interest in the 
accuracy and injustice of the decision to terminate his or her parental rights is a 
commanding one"). 
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is a fundamental right, though the state may intervene under the doctrine 
of parens patriae to protect the interest of a child, subject to legal 
safeguards for parents. 130 Indeed, it is illegal under the Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), ASFA, and state 
law for states to remove children before making "reasonable efforts" to 
preserve the family. 131 It also is a violation of the ADA to provide 
services to some parents and not others. In any event, it is a parent's 
inabilities which "qualify" her for services, not her abilities. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that for the purposes of the 
ADA, qualified individuals include those who are not receiving services 
voluntarily. 132 This category should include parents who are ordered to 
comply with programs, as invariably occurs after a case has been filed -
whether at a pre-fact-finding hearing, at the disposition, or at a 
permanency hearing. 
The third prong of the prima facie case can be met by showing 
intentional or unintentional discrimination. A parent could attempt to 
prove that she did not receive assistance because of unfounded beliefs 
about her disability and its effect on parenting. Tanya, for example, had 
raised Gaby until the age of two, and the only neglect finding against her 
was of excessive corporal punishment, identical to that of countless non-
disabled parents who are eventually reunified with their children. 133 Yet 
130 States have the discretion to construct and implement termination of parental 
rights statutes, but Stanley requires that a state make an "individual inquiry" into 
the fitness of the parent, not based on status, 405 U.S. at 645, and Santosky 
requires that termination be proved by "clear and convincing evidence", 455 
U.S. at 746. 
131 See Adoption and Safe Family Act§ 101(a)(15)(b)(i); Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act§ 47l(a)(15)(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 11400(1) 
(2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 39.402(7) (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 188, 
§ 3(a)(l) (2007); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 358(2)(a), 409 (2006). 
132 Yeskey, 118 F.3d at 173. 
133 According to statistics from the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services' Administration for Children and Families, in 2005, 70,878 children in 
New York were the subjects of substantiated reports of maltreatment, including 
excessive corporal punishment. JOHN A. GAUDIOSI, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERV., CHILD MAL TREAMENT 39 (2005), available at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cm05/cm05.pdf. According to the 
Child Welfare League of America, 65% of the children in foster care in 2001 
were reunited with their biological families. Child Welfare League of America, 
New York's Children 2004, http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/statefactsheets/ 
2004/newyork.pdf (last visited November 6, 2007). 
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Tanya's caseworker, perhaps based on what appeared to be a disbelief of 
Tanya's potential parenting capabilities, made little effort to reunite 
Tanya and Gaby. Such biased treatment by the agency is all too 
common for mentally disabled parents. 134 
In the alternative, a parent could prove that she was unintentionally 
discriminated against by making a disparate impact claim. 135 When state 
law mandates services to non-disabled parents but not disabled ones, as 
in New York, 136 the law has a disparate impact. A disparate impact 
argument could also be made where services to disabled, but not non-
disabled, parents have been cut because of budget constraints. 137 
A parent also can claim that she was discriminated against because 
the state did not adapt its reunification services to her needs, thereby 
denying her the benefits of public "services . . ., programs or 
activities." 138 The ADA requires that "a public entity . . . make 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the 
modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of 
disability."139 Parenting skills classes or housing assistance that are not 
tailored to a parent's mental disability are unproductive and therefore 
essentially a denial of benefits. 140 
Reasonable modifications should include integration into the 
community wherever possible. In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court 
found an ADA violation where the state did not provide community-
based treatment for mentally disabled individuals who were deemed 
qualified under the state's professional evaluation. 141 The Court held 
that institutionalization is a form of discrimination because it 
"perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are 
incapable or unworthy of participating in community life," and that 
134 See cases cited infra notes 346-48. 
135 Theresa Glennon, Walking with Them: Advocating for Parents with Mental 
Illnesses in the Child Welfare System, 12 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 273, 
305 (2003). A disparate impact claim under the ADA could be made where a 
state fails to provide meaningful access to a benefit that non-disabled 
individuals receive. Id. 
136 See infra note 219. 
137 See Glennon, supra note 135, at 306. 
138 42 U.S.C. § 12131. 
139 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007). 
140 See Glennon, supra note 135, at 296, 307. 
141 527 U.S. 581. 
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"confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life 
activities of individuals, including family relations."142 
In the context of parenting, the Third Circuit held in Helen L. v. 
Diario143 that the state had violated the ADA by not providing in-home 
services to a mother of two who used a wheelchair and required 
"assistance with certain activities of daily living." This failure to 
provide services forced the woman to live in a nursing home separate 
from her children. While this holding is not specific to mentally 
disabled parents, it serves as strong precedent in support of assisted 
living for parents residing with their children in community-based 
settings. Such plans would serve as an alternative to institutionalization 
of mentally disabled parents and foster care for their children. As 
previously noted, there are numerous supportive housing programs in 
New York, 144 as well as around the country, 145 for mentally disabled 
parents to live with their children. 
Similarly, in Henrietta D. v. Guiliani, a district court found an ADA 
violation where New York City had not provided intensive case 
management services to individuals with AIDS. 146 The court held that it 
was necessary and reasonable for the City to maintain a single service 
center where individuals with AIDS could seek housing, medical, and 
financial assistance. It can be argued that the special needs of people 
with AIDS are parallel to those of mentally disabled parents, who must 
navigate the complex and intimidating child welfare system. 147 It would 
be reasonable, then, for the state to specially train certain caseworkers to 
work with mentally disabled parents and refer them for services tailored 
to their needs. Moreover, since child welfare cases already have multiple 
142 Id. at 600-01. 
143 46 F.3d at 328. 
144 Supra note 100. 
145 Many states have housing programs that enable mentally disabled parents to 
live with their children. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development's Section 811 Supportive Housing for Persons with Disabilities 
program is one such program. See, e.g., Iowa City Housing Information, 
http://www.jeonet.com/city/planning/ichi/iiid.htm (last visited November 5, 
2007); New York State Campaign for Mental Health Housing, 
http://www.campaign4housing.org/members.html (last visited November 5, 
2007); West Central Illinois Continuum of Care, 
http://www.wciccc.com/HousingDirectory/ (last visited November 5, 2007). 
146 119 F. Supp. 2d 181. 
147 See Glennon, supra note 135, at 307. 
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levels of caseworkers, 148 specialized caseworkers should not be 
considered a fundamental alteration149 to the state's program (the 
fundamental alteration defense is explored below). 
2. State Defenses 
There are three defenses to the ADA: that the state does not have to 
make fundamental alterations to its programs in order to serve a disabled 
person, 150 that it does not have to serve someone who poses a direct 
threat, 151 and that the state is immune to suit by private citizens. 152 
i. Fundamental Alterations 
Title II permits an exception to the "no discrimination" requirements 
if doing so would "fundamentally alter" the nature of the program or 
service at issue. 153 Title III explicitly includes an "undue burden" 
defense, which also has been applied to Title II defendants. 154 The 
ADA's regulations specify several factors to consider in an "undue 
burden" claim, including the nature and cost of the proposed alteration, 
the overall financial resources of the agency, and the type of work the 
agency performs. 155 
148 In New York City, for example, most child welfare cases are handled by two 
casework teams, one at ACS and one at the contract agency. ACS assigns a 
"case manager," who reports to multiple levels of supervisors, and the contract 
agency assigns a caseworker who also reports to multiple levels of supervisors. 
See http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/ioc _initiative_ org_ chart.pdf 
for an organzational chart of the executive management of ACS; the Deputy 
Commissioner of Family Permanency Services oversees the Executive Director 
of Case Management, who supervisers the case managers, who monitor the 
"provider" agencies. For an example of the levels of supervision at a contract 
agency, see http://www.essnyc.org/staff.html. Regardless of the structure, all 
child welfare cases in all states have at least one caseworker and one supervisor. 
See also Glennon, supra note 135, at 307. 
149 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007). 
150 § 35.130(b)(7). 
151 § 36.208. 
152 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
153 § 35.130(b)(7). 
154 See, e.g., Helen L., 46 F.3d at 338. 
155 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2007). 
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In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court followed this balancing test 
by holding that "in evaluating a State's fundamental-alteration defense, 
the . . . Court must consider, in view of the resources available to the 
State, not only the cost of the providing ... care to the litigants, but also 
the range of services the State provides others with mental disabilities, 
and the State's obligation to mete out those services equitably."156 A 
New York court applied the balancing test in Sanon v. Wing, which held 
that the state had to continue providing home health care to plaintiffs 
through its Medicaid program instead of placing them in a nursing home 
because the state had not shown that the cost of home care was 
unreasonable with respect to the system as a whole. 157 
States can argue that providing services to mentally disabled parents, 
such as long term therapy, constitutes a fundamental alteration of its 
foster care program because they are unreasonably expensive. These 
costs, then, must be weighed against those incurred when a child remains 
in foster care, both before and after a termination of parental rights. 158 In 
New York, as in the rest of the country, most children remain in foster 
care after the TPR for a substantial length of time while an adoptive 
home is sought and finalized; 159 even if the child is adopted (which is not 
always the case), 160 the state often continues to bear the cost of foster 
care through adoption subsidies, which are paid until the child is 18 (and 
21 in some states, including New York161 ). In fact, it has been shown 
that some of the most expensive reunification services can actually save 
states money in the long run, because many services, such as 24-hour 
attendant care, are not necessary as the child gets older or the parent's 
156 527 U.S. at 597. 
157 2000 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 139 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000). 
158 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
159 See Leslie Kaufman, New York Acts To Ease Process In Foster Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2007, at Bl (stating that, in 2006, the average length of stay in 
foster care for a child in New York City was 58 months); see also U.S. DEPT. OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ADOPTION 
AND FOSTER CARE ANALYSIS SYSTEM REPORT (2000), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats _research/afcars/statistics/tpr _ tbl4 _ 20 
05.htm and http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report 
13.htm (stating that, in New York, the mean length of time between TPR and 
adoption in 2005 was 19.03 months and that the national mean length of time in 
2005 was 27 months); see also infra notes 311 & 313. 
160 See infra notes 311, 313, 315-17, & 319. 
161 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 451(1) (2007). 
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capabilities increase. 162 The initial cost of the services is offset by future 
savings, when the child is no longer in foster care. The question of an 
"undue financial burden" is a fact-specific inquiry; under the ADA, there 
is no justification for a total absence of services for mentally disabled 
parents when non-disabled parents are entitled to these services, 
especially since parents have a fundamental interest in retaining their 
parental rights. 163 The cost of reunification services would have to be 
astronomically and universally high in order for states to justify 
depriving all mentally disabled parents of the potential to be reunified 
with their children. Such an outcome is not supported by the facts. 
States also can claim that because the ADA's regulations specifically 
exclude "personal services,"164 they therefore are excused from 
providing services such as 24-hour attendant care to mentally disabled 
parents. This regulatory language should be read as clarifying that the 
ADA does not create a requirement that a public entity provide personal 
services. However, if a right to personal services exists through another 
law or practice, the ADA mandates that this be implemented in a non-
discriminatory way. 165 For example, New York requires "diligent 
efforts"166 for reunifying non-disabled parents with their children, which 
may entail a variety of services (including "personal services" such as 
homemakers167). Disabled parents are entitled to services that have the 
same potential, with or without reasonable modification, for facilitating 
reunification. 
As mentioned, in Tanya's case, the additional services that she 
required are not extremely costly. The essential components (more 
intensive casework services and prompt housing referrals) have little or 
no cost, and the other aspects, such as homemaker services, substance 
abuse counseling, and job assistance, are the same or similar to what 
162 See Jay Mathews, Custody Battle: The Disabled Fight to Raise Their 
Children, WASH. POST., Aug. 18, 1992, at ZlO (describing Santa Clara County, 
California program that reported a $1. 72 savings for every dollar spent on 
intensive family reunification services). 
163 See supra notes 129-30. 
164 28 C.F.R. § 35.135 (2007). 
165 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 28 CFR § 35.130(b)(7) (2007). 
166 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(7)(t)(3) (McKinney 2007). 
167 Non-disabled parents often are given homemakers/housekeepers and other 
in-home assistance. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.2(b)(5) 
(2007). 
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non-disabled parents receive. Regardless, these costs certainly did not 
outweigh Tanya's interest in regaining custody of her daughter; in fact, it 
had appeared for the first few years of the case, despite the lack of effort 
by the caseworker, that mother and daughter would be reunified (Tanya 
was visiting regularly, maintaining housing with her brother, and had not 
had any acute schizophrenic episodes). A state's potential savings 
through reunification of a family, rather than bearing the cost of 
maintaining a child in foster care, has been documented in similar 
cases. 168 
ii. Direct Threat 
States also could argue that requiring services for mentally disabled 
parents poses a "direct threat" to the safety of their children. 169 Title III 
includes a defense to a "direct threat," when the service or 
accommodation poses a "significant risk to the health or safety of others 
that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies . . . ."170 
Although Title II does not explicitly include the "direct threat" defense, 
it could be argued that a disabled person does not meet the "essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services"171 if the receipt of 
those services poses a direct threat to a third person (in this case, a 
child). 172 
168 Supra note 162. 
169 While states have not raised this issue directly in the few federal ADA-TPR 
cases that have been litigated, supra note 118, or in the state cases where the 
ADA has been raised, see, e.g., supra notes 41 and 43, agencies generally argue 
that mentally disabled parents pose a danger or are a direct threat to their 
children. See, e.g., In re B.J.F., 623 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); In re 
E.M.M.W, No. 01-0726, 2002 WL 987947 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002); In re John D., 
934 P.2d 308 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (holding the ADA inapplicable because the 
ground for the TPR was abandonment, and the state had no obligation to 
provide services to any parent when alleging abandonment). 
170 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2007). 
171 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2007). 
172 This approach was first articulated in Arline, 480 U.S. 273, in which a 
teacher was dismissed because she was infected with tuberculosis. The court 
found that she did not meet the requirements for protection under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because she might constitute a threat to her students. 
The Rehabilitation Act was the precursor to the ADA and the standards from 
this case were incorporated into the regulations implementing the "direct threat" 
defense in Title III. 
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However, the "direct threat" argument is without merit because the 
AACW A and AFSA mandate "reasonable efforts" to reunify families 
except when a court determines that one of three specific situations 
exists: if the parent has subjected the child to severe and repeated abuse; 
if the parent has committed, attempted to commit, or aided in the murder 
or involuntary manslaughter of one of his or her children, or has 
committed a felony assault resulting in serious bodily harm to one of his 
or her children; or if the parent's rights to another child have been 
terminated involuntarily. 173 This mandate has been adopted in the child 
protective statutes of each state. 174 The plain language of the federal 
statutes indicates that these were the only circumstances Congress 
established as a presumptive threat. 175 By the time a parent is eligible 
for "reasonable" efforts, any other "threat" has been eliminated by virtue 
of the fact that the child already has been removed from the parent's 
care.1 76 If the state thinks that a parent's mental illness constitutes a 
direct threat that cannot be ameliorated, it will have to prove this threat 
by clear and convincing evidence during the TPR. 177 As discussed, it is 
impossible for a state to meet this standard, in light of the ADA, without 
an inquiry involving evidence from some provision of services. 178 
In Tanya's case, she clearly did not constitute a direct threat to 
Gaby, as the caseworker never reported any inappropriate behavior 
toward her during the supervised visits, or any suspicion of such for the 
short time \\'.hen visits were unsupervised. Similarly successful visits are 
common for mentally disabled parents and their children, according to 
casework notes, 179 suggesting that the direct threat concern often may be 
overstated. 
173 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(B) (2007). 
174 New York delineates the exceptions for reasonable efforts. N.Y. FAM. CT. 
ACT § 1039-b (McKinney 2007). See Appendix B for the reasonable efforts 
statutes of each state. 
175 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(15)(B) (2007). 
176 Under all TPR statutes, a child must first be removed from the respondent's 
home and placed in foster care (and usually must spend at least 15 months in 
foster care) before a TPR can be filed. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b 
(McKinney 2007). See also Appendix C (addressing the grounds for TPR 
statutes of each state). 
177 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b; Appendix C; supra note 130. 
178 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 59. 
179 See cases cited infra notes 346-349, 351-353 & 355. 
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iii. Sovereign Immunity 
Another obstacle to a parent's federal claim 1s state sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 180 Although local 
government and contract agencies are not immune, any action contesting 
a TPR also will involve the state because TPRs are governed by state 
child welfare laws and state court decisions. A parent's primary goal in 
filing an ADA claim after a TPR likely will be injunctive relief, seeking 
to reinstate her rights and remand the case to family court. 181 However, 
if a court finds that the state is immune in a particular case, it will be 
protected from all forms of relief, whether monetary, injunctive, or 
. . 182 pumttve. 
The status of immunity and Title II is murky at this point. Title IV 
of the ADA specifically revokes state sovereign immunity, 183 and 
Congress invoked the Fourteenth Amendment as the source of its 
authority to enact the ADA, 184 but this revocation has been partially 
invalidated by Supreme and circuit court jurisprudence as it applies to 
Title II. 185 In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 
the Supreme Court determined that states could not be sued for monetary 
damages under Title I of the ADA, but specifically declined to address 
whether the same applied for Title II. 186 In 2006, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in U.S. v. Georgia to consider whether Title II validly 
abrogates sovereign immunity, but then did not squarely address the 
issue. 187 The Court held only that Title II validly abrogates state 
180 U.S. CONST. amend. XL ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State"). 
181 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). This section also provides for compensatory 
damages for successful claimants. 
182 The Eleventh Amendment on its face applies equally to suits in law and 
equity. The Supreme Court stated, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, that "the relief 
sought by a plaintiff suing a State is irrelevant to the question of whether the 
suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment . . . [and] whether Congress has 
power to abrogate States' immunity." 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996). 
183 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (2000). 
184 § 12101(b)(4). 
185 United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); see cases cited infra notes 
189 & 197-98. 
186 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001). 
187 546 U.S. 151. 
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sovereign immunity when it proscribes conduct that actually violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment; it left to the lower courts to determine, on a 
case-by-case basis, the more difficult question of whether conduct that 
violates Title II but does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment is still 
valid under Congress' Section 5 enforcement power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 188 To be valid under Section 5, the remedy 
proscribed by Congress must be congruent and proportional to specific 
findings of a pattern of state constitutional violations. 189 
In a TPR-ADA claim, a parent must prove either that her Fourteenth 
Amendment rights were violated, or that the state's conduct is actionable 
because it is legitimately prohibited by Congress under Section 5. 190 It 
would be difficult to demonstrate that a parent's Fourteenth Amendment 
rights have been violated because the disabled are not a suspect class, 
and the state only has to show that it has a rational basis for treating 
disabled parents differently than non-disabled ones to maintain its 
sovereign immunity. 191 
However, a Section 5 argument is easier to make because the 
Supreme Court, applying the Section 5 test, has found that Congress 
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in cases involving the right 
of access to courts. 192 According to the Court in Tennessee v. Lane, 
access to courts is a fundamental right, stemming from the constitutional 
guarantees under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 193 The Supreme Court also has held that parental rights 
derive from Due Process: "a parent's interests in the nurture, upbringing, 
companionship, care and custody of children are generally protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 194 Therefore, in 
an ADA case, a parent could argue that being denied services outright or 
services that are tailored to her disability is a violation of two sets of 
fundamental rights: those of a parent and those of a person trying to 
access the courts. And these rights intersect; a parent's ability to 
188 Id. at 159. 
189 See Lane, 541 U.S. 509; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); 
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365. 
190 Supra note 189. 
191 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 432. 
192 Lane, 541 U.S. 509. 
193 Id. at 533-34. 
194 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 77 (2000). 
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complete reunification services is inherently linked to the evidence used 
in TPR proceedings. 195 
The counter-argument is that Lane involved physical access to courts 
and not the more nuanced issue of evidence. But a parent's case will be 
bolstered if she can also prove a pattern of discrimination based on her 
disability. In Lane, the Supreme Court noted that "the unequal treatment 
of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long 
history," which justifies prophylactic measures by Congress. 196 If, as in 
Lane, a court finds that a state's treatment of a disabled parent reflects 
that which Congress intended to prevent, and that Title II is an 
appropriate remedy, then Section 5 should apply (and state sovereign 
immunity will be validly abrogated). 
It is unclear, however, how this argument would be received by a 
circuit court, as the courts are divided in their interpretations of the Lane 
holding. 197 In New York, the Second Circuit denied a Title II claim in 
the context of public education, finding that there was no fundamental 
right of access to post-secondary education for the disabled. 198 
However, a respondent parent's case may be distinguishable because 
both parental rights and the right of access to courts are fundamental, 
though no circuit court has yet to be confronted with this overlap. 199 
195 Supra note 59. 
196 Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
197 See Sacca v. Buffalo State Coll., No. Ol-CV-881A, 2004 WL 2095458, at *3 
(W.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2004); Johnson v. S.C. State Univ., No. CIVA3:02-CV-
2065(CFD), 2004 WL 2377225, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2004); see also 
Constantine v. Rectors of Geo. Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 490 (4th Cir. 2005); 
Ass'n for Disabled Am., Inc. v. Fla. Int'l. Univ., 405 F.3d. 954, 958-59 (11th 
Cir. 2005); Roe v. Johnson, 334 F. Supp. 2d 415, 421 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). But 
see Pace v. Bogalusa City Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 272, 287 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(declining to address whether the holding in Lane extends to disability 
discrimination in addition to public education). 
198 Press v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 388 F. Supp. 2d 127, 135 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). 
199 There have been ADA-TPR cases in federal courts, but none has reached the 
circuit court level with an argument based on two sets of fundamental rights. 
See Bartell v. Lohiser, 215 F.3d 550 (6th Cir. 2000), aff'g, 12 F.Supp. 2d 640 
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that the state did not violate the mother's 
constitutional right to raise her child because the state's interest in the child was 
greater than the mother's; the issue of the fundamental right to court access was 
not raised); McLeod, 1999 WL 33117123; Morrison, 1996 WL 684426. 
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Even if a court finds that the state is immune, a parent still may be 
able to seek injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, which provides an 
exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity.200 In order to qualify 
under Ex parte Young, the injunctive relief must end a continuing 
violation of federal law by a state employee acting in his official 
capacity.201 The applicability of Ex parte Young has been upheld in 
ADA cases.202 The Supreme Court also has stated that an Ex parte 
Young exception would be valid in Title I claims, 203 although the Court 
has not yet addressed this question addressed with respect to Title 11.204 
E. FILING AN ADA GRIEVANCE 
Aside from pursuing a federal case, a parent could file an ADA 
complaint with the local "ADA coordinator," according to federal 
regulation.205 Implementation of this regulation varies nationally, but the 
ADA coordinator is generally an employee of a state or county who 
oversees ADA compliance among public and contract agencies.206 
However, judging by New York City, this procedure is, at best, 
underutilized and unfamiliar to respondent parents. According to New 
York City's government website, the City has an ADA coordinator;207 
200 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
201 Id. at 159. 
202 See, e.g., Koslow v. Pennsylvania, 302 F.3d 161, 179 (3d Cir. 2002). 
203 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9. 
204 Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World: Insufficient State 
Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 1080 n.13 
(2002) (noting that although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the 
question of whether Ex parte Young applies to Title II, federal courts have 
permitted Title II claims made solely for injunctive relief to go forward under 
the doctrine). 
205 28 C.F.R. § 35. l 07(a) (2007) ("A public entity that employs 50 or more 
persons shall designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply 
with and carry out its responsibilities under [Part 35, Non Discrimination on the 
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services], including any 
investigation of any complaint communicated to it alleging its noncompliance 
with this part or alleging any actions that would be prohibited by this part. The 
public entity shall make available to all interested individuals the name, office 
address, and telephone number of the employee or employees designated 
pursuant to this paragraph"). 
206 Id. 
207 Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, http://www.nyc.gov/oath; 
http://nyc.gov/html/oath/html/ada _grievances.html. (last visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
According to the website and two phone calls placed to the Office of 
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however, the person named on the website does not appear to know that 
ADA coordination is one of her job responsibilities.208 Moreover, even 
if this person is capable of acting as New York City's ADA coordinator, 
she never surfaces in child protection proceedings and no one informs 
respondent parents that an ADA coordinator is supposed to be 
available.209 But filing a complaint with an ADA coordinator could be a 
potential avenue for advocacy, at least outside of New York City. 
Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) by my research assistant (8/2/07; 
8/6/07), the person designated in New York City is Cherron Howard-Williams. 
Telephone interview (Aug. 2 and 6, 2007). A search on New York State 
government's website, http://www.ny.gov, for the "Americans with Disabilitlies 
Act" results in various document intended to help businesses and other facilities 
comply with the ADA. The only document of relevance to an individual with a 
claim is a health care complaint form, but there is no accompanying or 
explanatory text. The search also leads to the New York City Mayor's Office 
for People with Disabilites, which in turn links to the DOJ's ADA website, 
http://www.ada.gov (searches conducted 8/9/07 and 8/10/07). 
208 My research assistant called the OATH office twice. The first time he asked 
for the Americans with Disabilities Act coordinator, and was connected to 
Cherron Howard-Williams. Ms. Howard-Williams, however, stated that she is 
not the ADA coordinator, but works with disciplining government employees 
when they make mistakes. She stated that she did not know who the ADA 
coordinator is and did not have any suggestions for how to find that person. 
Telephone interview (Aug. 2, 2007). On the second phone call to OATH, the 
research assistant again asked the operator for the person who coordinates or 
works with the Americans with Disabilities Act, or the ADA. The research 
assistant was again connected to Cherron Howard-Williams. This time, Ms. 
Howard-Williams reiterated that she does not work with the Americans with 
Disabilities Act in any capacity and, furthermore, has never been involved in 
any child protective matter in any capacity in New York City. Telephone 
interview (Aug. 6, 2007). A search on New York State government's website 
(www.ny.gov) for the "Americans with Disabilities Act" results in various 
document intended to help businesses and other facilities comply with the ADA. 
The only document of relevance to an individual with a claim is a health care 
complaint form, but there is no accompanying or explanatory text; for more 
information on the ADA, the website links to the DOJ's ADA website 
(http://www.ada.gov). New York State, http://www.ny.gov (search "Americans 
with Disabilities Act") (last visited Aug. 9 and 10, 2007). 
209 Having represented hundreds of children in New York City and Nassau 
County Family Courts from 2002 to the present, I have no knowledge of an 
ADA coordinator ever appearing in Family Court, nor do the numerous 
colleagues with whom I work on a daily basis. In addition, no parent or parent's 
attorney with whom I have spoken has indicated that they ever were informed of 
an ADA coordinator. 
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A parent could also file a claim within 180 days of the 
discriminatory act with the Department of Justice (DOJ) or with the 
federal agency that is "most closely associated with the activity of the 
state or local govemment"210 (in this case, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Region 
2).211 
There is no penalty for filing with the wrong agency, and a complaint 
can always be filed with the Department of Justice, as long as it is within 
the 180-day period. The federal agency has authority to investigate the 
complaint. It may attempt to resolve the problem informally. If informal 
resolution fails ... it may issue a letter of findings.212 
If the situation still is not ameliorated, the federal agency may 
exercise its authority to sue the state or local government for the 
violation.213 But again, the procedure for filing a claim with the local 
federal agency (the Administration for Children and Families) or with 
the Department of Justice in New York State is unknown to respondent 
parents, and, to my knowledge, has never been used in the State.214 
210 ROBERT M. LEVY & LEONARD S. RUBENSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES 177 (Norman Dorsen ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1996). 
211 ACF Region 2, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/region2/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2007). 
212 LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 210, at 177. 
213 Id. 
214 My research assistant placed three phone calls to the federal Administration 
for Children and Families, Region 2. On the first two calls, the people 
answering the phone expressed complete bewilderment over the question of 
how to file an ADA claim and what a respondent parent could or should do in 
this type of case. The research assistant was referred both times to New York 
City's Administration for Children's Services (ACS) (the City's social services 
agency). On the third phone call to the federal Administration for Children and 
Families, the research assistant was told to call the Legal Aid Society and that a 
parent would have to do the same. Telephone interviews (Aug. 1, 2, and 6, 
2007). When a subsequent phone call to ACS's Parent's & Children's Rights 
Hotline at the Office of Advocacy (information available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/advocacy/office _ advocacy.shtml) was made 
on August 7, 2007, the research assistant was told that the Office of Advocacy 
has never handled, and would not handle, an ADA claim, and that a parent 
would have to call the Legal Aid Society. The Office of Advocacy did not 
mention that this would be impossible for nearly all of the parents whose 
children are the subject of abuse and neglect proceedings in New York City, 
because the children already are represented by Legal Aid. Legal Aid Society 
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Furthermore, the DOJ has never sued a state or local government on 
behalf of a parent in any jurisdiction in the country.215 
II. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND STATE CHILD 
WELFARE LAW 
A. SERVICES FOR MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS 
According to the Americans with Disabilities Act, "no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, 
programs, or activities of a public entity .... "216 Therefore, if a state 
offers services to non-disabled parents, it should do the same for those 
who are disabled. There is a strong argument that disabled parents are 
"qualified" under the ADA for the services. Furthermore, the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act (ASF A) requires state agencies to engage in 
"reasonable efforts" to reunify all families. 217 Exceptions can only be 
made when a court determines that one of three conditions exists.218 
State child protection laws, however, vary in their compliance with 
the ADA and ASF A in equal access to services for parents. Appendix B 
contains a chart of state laws regarding entitlement to reunification 
services. 
of New York, http://legal-aid.org/en/whatwedo/juvenilepractice.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2007) (stating that 90% of subject children in New York City are 
represented by Legal Aid). A respondent parent cannot be represented by Legal 
Aid if the firm already represents one or more of their children, because this 
creates a conflict of interest. In order to contact the DOJ, a respondent parent 
would have to be aware of the ADA, the DOJ, and the possibility of this type of 
advocacy. Based on the above phone calls, my five years of work in New York 
City and Nassau County Family Courts, and the search described infra note 215, 
it is highly unlikely that a parent ever would have such an awareness. 
215 According to the most comprehensive search of cases available from the 
Department of Justice's ADA Enforcement website, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/enforce.htm (covering April 1994 to June 2006). 
216 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2007). 
217 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
(codified as amended to scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
218 42 U.S.C. § 67l(a)(l5)(B) (2007). 
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1. States without Reunification Services Requirements 
New York is the only state in which the court may terminate the 
rights of a mentally disabled parent without proof that the agency 
provided reunification services and without a prior court decision 
allowing the agency to forego these services.219 New York does require 
child welfare agencies to engage in "diligent efforts," which involves 
providing services, to reunify parents with their children before a court 
can terminate rights on the basis of permanent neglect, severe abuse, or 
repeated abuse.220 And ASFA requires states to make reasonable efforts 
toward reunification for all parents. 221 ASFA's exceptions to reasonable 
efforts were codified in the New York law222 for the "sole purpose" of 
complying with ASF A, 223 and the two statutes are virtually identical. 224 
Furthermore, New York County Family Court has held that in a 
motion225 asking to dispense with reasonable efforts, the movant is 
required to prove that one of the six conditions delineated in ASF A 
exists. 226 
However, in spite of the ADA, ASF A, and state law, New York 
courts have continually held that agencies do not have to engage in any 
"diligent" or "reasonable" efforts before a court may terminate parental 
rights on the basis of mental illness. 227 According to the courts, the TPR 
statute lacks a diligent efforts mandate for causes of action based on 
219 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (4)(c) (2007); infra notes 231-34. 
220 Id. § 384-b (7)(a), (7)(t)(3), (8)(a)(iv), (8)(b )(iii). 
221 Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) 
(codified as amended to scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
222 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1039-b (McKinney 2007). 
223 In re Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d 822, 824 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999). See also 
In re Jordy 0., 696 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999). 
224 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §1039-b(b)(l)-(6) (providing that severe and repeated 
abuse of the subject child; murder/manslaughter or felony assault of the subject 
child, or another child of the parent; and termination with regard to another 
child are grounds for being excused from reasonable efforts). 
225 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§ 1039-b (McKinney 2007). 
226 In re Marino S., Jr., 693 N.Y.S.2d at 833. 
227 See Jn re Kyle F., 14 A.D.3d 822, 823 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Jn re Michael 
D., 306 A.D.2d 938, 938 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); In re Harry K., 706 N.Y.S.2d 
657, 657 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re Juliana V., 671 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1998); In re Belinda S., 592 N.Y.S.2d 372, 373 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1993); In re Demetruis F., 575 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). 
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mental disability or illness.228 "The diligent efforts requirement in a 
neglect proceeding is specifically required by statute. It is not, however, 
required by statute in a proceeding [for mental illness], and we decline to 
read such a requirement into the statute."229 However, to my knowledge, 
no mentally disabled parent in New York has raised the ADA as the 
basis for entitlement to "diligent" or "reasonable" efforts prior to 
termination. 
The treatment of mentally disabled parents under New York law is 
indicative of discriminatory treatment around the country,230 although 
parents in other states are entitled to procedural safeguards. In Utah, 
there is a statutory presumption against reunification services when the 
court finds by clear and convincing evidence that a "parent is suffering 
from a mental illness of such magnitude that it renders the parent 
incapable of utilizing reunification services."231 California's statute is 
similar, but two medical health experts must provide the clear and 
convincing evidence of the parent's mental disability.232 Other states 
have comparable standards, allowing courts to decide that a service plan 
is unwarranted either because of the parent's mental disability,233 or 
because it is generally inconsistent with the child's best interests.234 
228 In re Jammie CC., 540 N.Y.S.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
229 Id. 
230 See Susan Kerr, The Application of the Americans with Disabilities Act to the 
Termination of the Parental Rights of Individuals with Mental Disabilities, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 387, 412 (2000). 
231 UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-3a-311(3)(d)(i)(B) (2007). 
232 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 361.5(b)(2) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7827(c) 
(2003). 
233 ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.086(c)(5) (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-846(B)(l)(b) 
(2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 610.127(6) (2007). 
234 COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1)(b)(I) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ l 7a-l 12G)(2) (2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.8055(2)(b) (2006); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 15-l l-55(d) (2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 22, § 4041(2)(A-
2)(2)(2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29C (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 260.012(a) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-609(4)(c) (2005); NEV. REV. 
STAT. § 432B.393(2) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-28(A) (2007); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-507(b)(l) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(6) 
(2006); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5515(d) (2006); W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 49-6-
5(b)(6) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-309(c)(iii) (2007). See also In re 
Amelia W., 772 A.2d 619, 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that father would 
not benefit from services); In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 642 A.2d 
201, 210 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that agency is not required to provide 
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New York, however, is alone in failing to require proof in court before 
dispensing with reunification services. The only time an agency in New 
Yark is required to engage in reasonable efforts with a mentally disabled 
parent is before the initial removal of the child, and only if the court 
considers it "appropriate."235 Once the child has been removed, and the 
agency thinks the case is progressing toward TPR, it will not be 
obligated to assist the parent further, since TPRs based on mental 
disability do not require proof of diligent efforts.236 The majority of 
mental disability TPRs in New York result in termination judgments, 
without such proof.237 
2. States with Reunification Services Requirements 
The majority of states (thirty, as well as DC) statutorily require 
services for all parents, including mentally disabled parents.238 These 
statutes only exclude services under the aggravated circumstances 
delineated in ASF A. 239 Courts in these states usually uphold this right to 
services for mentally disabled parents.240 However, a statutory mandate 
services where evidence overwhelmingly suggests that parent will .never be fit 
again). 
235 N.Y. FAM. CT. §§ 1022 (a)(iii), 1027(b)(ii), 1028(b) (McKinney 2005). 
236 N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
237 New York State Kids' Well-Being Indicators Clearinghouse, KWIC Indicator 
Profile: Foster Care TPR Judgments - Terminated Judgments, 
http://www.nyskwic.org/ access_ data/ind _profile.cfm ?subindicatorID=83 
(stating that, in 2005, 59.1% of all TPRs in New York State, and 64.7% in New 
York City, ended in terminated judgments). An even higher proportion of 
mental disability TPRs end in terminated judgments. See, e.g., In re Peter GG, 
33 A.D.3d 1104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Loretta C., 32 A.D.3d 764 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2006); In re Henry W., 31 A.D.3d 940 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re 
Kyle F., 14 A.D.3d 822; In re Nina D., 6 A.D.3d 702 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In 
re Michael D., 306 A.D.2d 938; In re Lisa Marie S., 304 A.D.2d 762 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003). Compare In re Robert M. P. -D., 31 A.D.3d 560 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006) (holding that rights are not terminated where petitioner only 
introduced the forensic reports of a psychologist without having him testify); In 
re Lina Catalina R., 21 A.D.3d 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding mentally 
disabled parent's rights not terminated where court-appointed psychologist 
stated that she did not have reasonable degree of certainty as to the foreseeable 
future). 
238 See Appendix B. 
239 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(15)(D) (West 2007). 
240 See, e.g., In re Brianna D., 798 A.2d 413, 415 (R.I. 2002); In re Chapman, 
631 P .2d 831 (Or. Ct. App. 1981 ). 
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is not a guarantee that mentally disabled parents will receive these 
mandated services. In B.S. v. Cullman, 241 two psychologists opined that 
rehabilitative services might not enable the mother to successfully parent 
on her own. Therefore, the court determined that providing services 
"would place an undue burden on an agency, [which was] already 
struggling with its duty to rehabilitate those parents and reunite those 
families who [could] be aided by its assistance."242 In N.R. v. State 
Department of Human Resources, 243 the court similarly held that the 
statute requiring services did not apply where a parent's conduct was 
unlikely to change in the future; a Texas court found likewise in Salas v. 
Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services. 244 These cases 
demonstrate that, even in states with statutory obligations to provide 
services, mentally disabled parents face barriers based on what may be 
ambiguous or discriminatory criteria. 245 
B. MENTAL DISABILITY AS A GROUND FOR TERMINATION 
The ADA prohibits decisions based on a person's disabled status. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence extends this prohibition to decisions 
regarding parents. As discussed, the Court has long held that parenting 
is a fundamental right246 and that states have the discretion to construct 
and implement termination of parental rights statutes, limited by the 
Stanley v. lllinois241 requirement that a state make an "individual 
inquiry" into the fitness of the parent, not based on status, and the 
Santosky v. Kramer248 requirement that termination be proved by "clear 
and convincing evidence." As Stanley makes clear, the protection of the 
family unit is inveterate. 249 Indeed, a prevalent quotation among courts 
241 865 So. 2d 1188 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
242 Id. at 1196. 
243 606 So. 2d 161 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992). 
244 71 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App. 2002). 
245 SeeN.Y. Soc. SERV. § 384-b(4)(c), (6) (McKinney 2007). 
246 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645; Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. 
247 405 U.S. at 657. 
248 455 U.S. at 756. 
249 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("[We have] ... frequently emphasized the 
importance of the family. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children 
have been deemed 'essential,' Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, (1923), 
'basic civil rights of man,' Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541, 62 (1942), 
and '[r]ights far more precious than property rights,' May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 
528, 533, (1953). 'It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
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and scholars250 is that termination of parental rights is "the family law 
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case."251 States, however, 
vary in their compliance with the ADA and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the use of disabled status as a basis for termination.252 
Appendix C contains a chart of state laws regarding mental disability as 
a ground for a TPR. 
1. States in which Mental Disability Is an Express Statutory Ground for 
Termination of Parental Rights 
Under New York law, parental rights may be terminated when the 
parent is "presently and for the foreseeable future unable, by reason of 
mental illness or mental retardation, to provide proper and adequate care 
for a child who has been in the care of an authorized agency for the 
period of one year."253 Mental illness is defined as "an affliction with a 
mental disease or mental condition which is manifested by a disorder or 
disturbance in behavior, feeling, thinking or judgment to such an extent 
that if such child were placed in or returned to the custody of the parent, 
the child would be in danger of becoming a neglected child. "254 Mental 
retardation is defined as "subaverage intellectual functioning which 
originates during the developmental period and is associated with 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.' Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). The 
integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra, 262 U.S. at 399, the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
supra, 316 U.S. at 541, and the Ninth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 496, (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)"). 
250 See, e.g., In re FM, 163 P.3d 844, 851 (Wyo. 2007); In re K.D.L., 58 P.3d 
181, 186 (Nev. 2002); In re Hayes, 679 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ohio 1979); Douglas 
E. Cressler, Requiring Proof Beyond A Reasonable Doubt in Parental Rights 
Termination Cases, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 785, 794 (1994); Melissa L. 
Breger, Introducing the Construct of the Jury into Family Violence Proceedings 
and Family Court Jurisprudence, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 12 (2006); 
Bernardine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the 
Margins, 2 U. CHI L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2 (1995); Leigh Goodmark, 
Achieving Batterer Accountability in the Child Protection System, 63 KY. L. J. 
613, 626 (2004). 
251 In re Smith, 601N.E.2d45, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991). 
252 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (McKinney 2007); see also Appendix C. 
253 Id. § 384-b (4)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
254 Id. § 384-b (6)(a) (McKinney 2007). 
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impairment in adaptive behavior to such an extent that if such child were 
placed in or returned to the custody of the parent, the child would be in 
danger of becoming a neglected child as defined by the family court 
act."255 
The termination must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence," 
including an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist or 
psychologist.256 Under the statute and case law, this person may base his 
testimony on a single interview and is not required to review any 
records257 or to perform any psychological tests on the parent. 258 If the 
parent does not make herself available for the interview, the court-
appointed psychiatrist or psychologist may testify on the basis of "other 
available information."259 Although a parent is allowed to call her own 
expert to testify, this is often impossible for indigent parents and their 
court-appointed lawyers. 260 New York's indigent defense system has, in 
255 Id. 
256 Id. §§ 384-b (3)(g), 384-b (6)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
257 See In re Loretta C., 32 A.D.3d 764, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (interview 
lasting only 40 minutes). 258In re Peter GG., 33 A.D.3d 1104 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
259 N.Y. Soc. SERV LAW§ 384 b (6)(e) (McKinney 2007). 
26° Court-appointed lawyers in New York are paid $75 per hour in and out-of-
court, and the state will reimburse them up $125 per hour for a psychiatrist to 
testify, and $90 per hour for a psychologist to testify. STATE OF NEW YORK, 
APPELLATE DIVISION, SUPREME COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, LAW 
GUARDIAN PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK (2007) (prior to 2004, the 
rate-of-pay for court-appointed lawyers was $40 in-court and $25 out-of-court). 
According to a report commissioned by Chief Judge Kaye, these rates for court-
appointed lawyers and their experts are inadequate, and coupled with extremely 
high case loads, can result in sub-par defense. ST A TUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN 
NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE 
OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES (JUNE 16, 2006), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/ 
SpangenbergGroupReport.pdf. Court-appointed attorneys also have difficulty 
retaining experts: "There are situations where lawyers have to go begging for 
experts ... to take cases on 18-b rates." Id. For a discussion of the crisis in the 
representation of parents in child protective proceedings around the country, 
including a lack of skill and resources, see Kathleen A Baillie, The Other 
Neglected Parties in Child Protective Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the 
Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1998); Susan 
Calkins, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Parental-Rights Termination 
Cases: The Challenge for Appellate Courts, 6 J. APP PRAC & PROCESS 179 
(2004). See also Mark Green et al., PUBLIC ADVOCATE FOR THE CITY OF NEW 
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fact, been characterized as a "crisis" by numerous authorities.261 
Nevertheless, mental illness terminations have been held constitutional 
by the New York Court of Appeals.262 
Although New Yark' s termination of parental rights statute never 
has been reviewed in federal court; nor has the Court of Appeals 
addressed it since the ADA's enactment, the statute likely would not 
survive judicial scrutiny. The statute's "clear and convincing" standard 
arguably is in violation of both the ADA and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence. Important factual determinations often are based on the 
opinions of a single psychiatrist who conducts only one interview, 
assuming the parent consents to be interviewed by a psychiatrist at all; 
because he has very limited interaction with the mentally disabled 
parent, the psychiatrist inevitably makes statements based on 
presumptions about group characteristics rather than on his own actual 
observations of individual behavior.263 Making assumptions based on 
disability is precisely what Congress intended to eliminate with the 
YORK, JUSTICE DENIED: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR BIRTH 
p ARENTS IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS, 30-31 (2000) (citing a study that 
found that only 5% of Family Court cases in the Bronx contained at least one 
motion by a parent's attorney). 
261 
"New York's indigent defense system is in a serious state of crisis .... Every 
day - and for years - this dysfunctional system subjects indigent adults ... 
across the state to a severe and unacceptable risk of being denied meaningful 
and effective representation in violation of their state and federal right to 
counsel. This crisis cannot be adequately addressed without a substantial 
increase in statewide indigent defense funding." THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, 
STATUS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN NEW YORK: A STUDY FOR CHIEF JUDGE 
KAYE'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES ii 
(2006), available at 
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefensecommission/SpangenbergGrou 
pReport.pdf; see also Vitullo-Marten, supra note 109; NEW YORK APPELLATE 
DIVISION FIRST DEPARTMENT COMMITTEE ON REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR, 
CRISIS IN THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF THE POOR (2001); Sengupta, supra 
note 106. 
262 In re Nereida S., 439 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1982). 
263 It also should be noted that diagnosis of mental illness is not always accurate. 
Studies show that an individual who is hostile to the examiner is more likely to 
be diagnosed with a serious mental illness, and many therapists "view the lack 
of cooperation as evidence of mental illness." Paul Bernstein, Termination of 
Parental Rights on the Basis of Mental Disability: A Problem in Policy and 
Interpretation, 22 PAC. L.J. 1155, 1175 (1991). See also Kerr, supra note 230, 
at 413 (arguing for input from a variety of sources, not just one psychiatrist). 
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ADA, as shown by its finding that "individuals with disabilities are a 
discrete and insular minority who have been ... subjected to a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment ... based on ... stereotypic assumptions 
not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to 
participate in, and contribute to society."264 In light of the ADA's 
purpose, one "expert" arguably does not satisfy the burden of proof 
required under Stanley,265 for an individual inquiry, and under Santosky, 
266 for clear and convincing evidence, in a termination proceeding. 
It is true that the Supreme Court has shown great deference to 
"professional" opinions in the involuntary commitment context. In 
Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that "decisions made by the 
appropriate professional [in an institution] are entitled to a presumption 
of correctness" because this "is necessary to enable institutions of this 
type ... to continue to function."267 However, the circumstances of a 
TPR are different in that the state's interest in protecting institutions is 
not involved. The state does have a compelling interest in protecting the 
safety and "best interest" of the child,268 but when considering testimony 
at a TPR, safety is not at issue because a child is never immediately 
returned to the parent if the TPR is denied. Indeed, it likely will be a 
year or more before the parent regains physical custody.269 Therefore, 
264 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2007). 
265 Stanley, 405 U.S. 645. 
266 Santosky, 455 U.S. 745. 
267 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982). 
268 Supra note 69; see also N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(l)(a) (McKinney 
2007) ("[T]he health and safety of children is of paramount importance"); see 
also Appendix D. 
269 When a TPR is denied, the agency is usually ordered to better plan with and 
service the parent. See, e.g., Jn re Shantelle W., 185 A.D.2d 935, 940 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1992) ("Under the circumstances of this case, the petitioner's efforts 
fell short of the reasonable efforts necessary to alleviate the mother's mental 
illness and fulfill its obligation to strengthen the parental tie between mother 
and child. Accordingly, we reverse the Family Court's finding, and direct the 
petitioner to take additional steps to assist the mother in overcoming her 
problems"); see also Jn re Jean G., 225 A.D.2d 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) 
(overturning TPR because summons was deficient in that it did not give notice 
that adoption of the child, without the parent's consent, could result); Jn re 
Dochingozi B., 57 N.Y.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (finding that statutory 
requirements for a TPR had not been met, and remitting the matter to Family 
Court for further proceedings). The child remains in foster care until the parent 
has complied with the revised service plan, the visits have increased, and a trial 
discharge has occurred. Under N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1089 (d)(2)(viii)(C) 
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requiring a more in-depth mental health evaluation of the parent would 
not infringe on the state's interests. 
New York's statute is also problematic in that TPRs are based on 
predictions about future behavior.270 In civil confinement cases, courts 
make decisions based on predictions of "dangerousness,"271 but experts 
acknowledge the inaccuracy of these judgments; a quintessential review 
of the scientific research concluded that two out of three clinical 
predictions of future dangerousness were wrong,272 and the American 
Psychiatric Association states that unreliability of these predictions is 
"an established fact within the profession."273 It is also clinically 
difficult to predict the future behavior of mentally disabled parents, and 
thus the impact of that behavior on the safety and well-being of the 
child.274 And, as discussed above, the decision in a TPR does not 
(McKinney 2007), neither trial nor final discharge can take place without the 
court finding that this is appropriate and issuing an order allowing for it. It is 
usually at least one year following the denial of a TPR before the child is 
reunited with the parent on either trial or permanent status. 
270 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007). 
271 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563, 573-4 (1975); Scopes v. Shah, 398 N.Y.S.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 
1977); see also LEVY & RUBENSTEIN, supra note 210. 
272 JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 6-7 
(National Institute of Mental Health 1981 ). 
273 Brief Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 12, 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
274 See Robert Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the 
Mentally Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1219 (1990) ("Scientific 
evidence, however, does not suggest a meaningful correlation between mental 
retardation and inadequate parenting. Moreover, the evidence does suggest that 
any deficiencies in parenting are not immutable, but can be remedied with 
proper training"); Michael Craft, Low Intelligence and Delinquency, in MENTAL 
HANDICAP 53 (Michael Craft, Joan Bicknell & Sheila Hollins eds., 1985) 
(stating that research indicates no correlation between mental retardation and 
violence generally); Robert F. Schilling et. al., Child Maltreatment and 
Mentally Retarded Parents: Is There a Relationship?, 20 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 201, 206 (1982) (noting that evidence is contradictory on 
whether mental retardation is correlated with child maltreatment); Teresa 
Jacobsen et al., Assessing Parenting Competency in Individuals with Mental 
Illness, 24 J. MENTAL HEALTH ADMIN. 189 (1997) (suggesting that determining 
the parenting capabilities of individuals with severe mental disorders who are 
alleged perpetrators of child abuse or neglect is a profoundly difficult task and 
discussing the methodological shortcomings of some widely used assessment 
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involve a calculation of imminent risk, yet the holding of the New York 
Appellate Division was to resolve conflicting evidence of potential 
parental abilities in favor of the petitioning agency. As the court 
explained, "[W]e have consistently held that the possibility that 
respondent's condition, with proper treatment, may improve in the future 
is insufficient to over turn Family Court's determination . . . 
Accordingly, to the extent that the expert opinions conflict with respect 
to respondent's future ability to care for her children, we agree with 
Family Court's resolution [terminating rights]."275 
strategies); Ronald Siefer et al., Parental Psychopathology, Multiple Contextual 
Risks, and One-Year Outcomes in Children, 25 1. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 
423 (1996) (pointing to the importance of examining different aspects of 
maternal mental illness in social context and noting that maternal illness is not 
universally associated with adverse child outcomes); Karen S. Budd & Michelle 
J. Holdsworth, Issues in Clinical Assessment of Minimal Parenting Competence, 
25 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 2 (1996) (stating that many of the tools 
currently used for parenting assessments, such as projective tests, personality 
profiles, and intelligence tests, were not intended for the purpose of evaluating 
parenting capability or for parents with major psychiatric illness, and they are 
not empirically linked with observed parenting behavior); HARRIET P. LEFLEY, 
FAMILY CAREGIVING IN MENTAL ILLNESS 72 (David E. Biegel & Richard 
Schulz eds. 1996) ("[An] analysis of recent studies ... of violent behavior by 
individuals with serious mental illness ... conclude[s] that the vast majority of 
mentally ill persons are not more dangerous than others in the general 
population"); Morton M. Silverman, Children of Psychiatrical/y Ill Parents: A 
Prevention Perspective, 40 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY1257, 1259 
(1989) (A 1983 study found that "[a]s the depressed mothers recovered, many, 
but not all, of the reported problems in the mothers' relationships with other 
children improved, and many of the adolescent's problems diminished as 
well"); Mrinal Mullick, et al., Insight into Mental Illness and Child 
Maltreatment Risk Among Mothers with Major Psychiatric Disorders, 52 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 488 (2001) (concluding that insight into mental illness 
may function as a protective factor that influences the risk of child maltreatment 
in mothers with mental illness and that measures of insight could be usefully 
incorporated into comprehensive parenting assessments for mothers with 
psychiatric disorders). 
275 In re Trebor, 295 A.D.2d 648 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
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Thirty-one other states276 also link mental disability to a present and 
future inability to care for a child, leaving the terms open to 
interpretation and ripe for potentially discriminatory judgments.277 As 
described in Part I, there are an array of services for parents with 
disabilities,278 and many can care for children with appropriate 
support,279 but when the statutory definitions are vague, it becomes easy 
276See Appendix C. One other state, Wisconsin, terminates mentally disabled 
parents' rights on the basis of disability but only "when the parent is presently, 
and for a cumulative period of at least 2 years within the 5 years immediately 
prior to the filing of the petition has been, an inpatient at one or more hospitals . 
. . licensed treatment facilities ... or state treatment facilities" on account of 
mental illness or developmental disability. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(3)(a) 
(West 2007). 
277 See Alexis C. Collentine, Respecting Intellectually Disabled Parents: A Call 
for Change in State Termination of Parental Rights Statutes. 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 535 (2005); see also Kerr, supra note 230. 
278 See supra notes 96 and 100 for a description of the services in New York and 
supra note 145 for a description of the national housing programs. See also 
Invisible Children's Project, http://www.nmha.org/go/icp__project (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2007); Mental Health America, Frequently Asked Questions: How do I 
find a local Mental Health America affiliate?, http://www.nmha.org/go/ 
find_affiliate (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); Mental Health Association in New 
Jersey Programs and Services, http://www.mhanj.org/ProgramsServices/ 
prog_serv2.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2007); Beth R. Hinden et al., A Survey of 
Programs for Parents with Mental Illness and Their Families: Identifying 
Common Elements to Build the Evidence Base, 33 J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES 
& RES. 21 (2006). 
279 See David McConnell & Gwynnyth Llewellyn, Stereotypes, Parents with 
Intellectual Disability and Child Protection, 24 J. Soc. WELFARE & FAM. L. 297 
(2002); Hayman, supra note 274; Daphna Oyserman et al., Resources and 
Supports for Mothers with Severe Mental Illness, 19 HEAL TH & SOCIAL WoRK 
132, 141 (1994) ("[T]here is no reason to assume that women with [severe 
mental illness] cannot function as mothers"); J. Bazar, Mentally Ill Moms Aided 
in Keeping Their Children, THE APA MONITOR 32 (Dec. 1990) (concluding that 
a large percentage of mothers with severe mental illness can be successful as 
mothers with adequate support programs); Teresa Jacobsen, Mentally Ill 
Mothers in the Parenting Role: Clinical Management and Treatment, in 
PARENTAL PSYCHIATRIC DISORDER: DISTRESSED PARENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 
114 (Michael Gopfert et al. eds., Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 2003) 
(noting that services that build on a mentally ill parent's strengths and engage 
the parent in a collaborative process are more successful); Joanne Nicholson & 
Andrea Blanch, Rehabilitation for Parenting Roles for People with Serious 
Fall 2007] No Chance to Prove Themselves 161 
to make an automatic leap from disability to inability to care for a child, 
in both casework practice and as proof in court. 
Another problematic, but unique, aspect of New York's statute is 
that once parental rights are terminated based on mental disability, the 
case is closed; there is no statutory requirement that the court decide 
whether the TPR also is in the best interest of the child.280 In New York, 
TPRs based on permanent neglect281 and TPRs based on severe or 
repeated abuse282 are bifurcated proceedings: first, the grounds for the 
TPR are proven at trial, and then a dispositional hearing is held to decide 
whether it is in the child's best interest to be committed to the custody 
and guardianship of the agency.283 This dispositional hearing is the only 
time the court considers best interest, and custody is not transferred until 
the conclusion of the hearing.284 In every other state, the TPR 
proceeding is not bifurcated; the court contemplates the grounds for a 
TPR simultaneously with the best interest of the child, and custody is 
committed at the conclusion of a single trial.285 The Supreme Court of 
Rhode Island encapsulates the reasoning behind this: "Once [parental 
unfitness] is established, the best interests of the child outweigh all other 
consideration~. "286 
Many states also elaborate on the best-interest criteria to be used in a 
TPR, and ASF A waives its mandate for filing a TPR if it is against the 
best interest of a child.287 Numerous states require consideration of the 
Mental Illness, 18 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 109 (1994) (outlining a 
model of effective rehabilitation for parents). 
280 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(4)(c), (6) (McKinney 2007). 
281 Id. § 384-b(4)(d). 
282 Id. § 384-b(4)(e). 
283 Id. § 384-b(3)(g). Dispositional hearings are conducted in cases of 
permanent neglect as provided in N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT§§ 623, 631 (McKinney 
2007), and in cases of severe or repeated abuse, as provided in N.Y. Soc. SERV. 
LAW§ 384-b(8)(f). 
284 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b (McKinney 2007); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§ 631 (McKinney 2007); In re Troy M., 156 Misc.2d 1000, 1003-05 (N.Y. Fam. 
Ct. 1992). 
285 See Appendix D. 
286 In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989). 
287 ASF A provides the following as compelling reasons not to file a TPR: the 
child is being cared for by a relative; the state agency has documented in the 
case plan that a TPR is not in the best interest of the child; or reasonable efforts 
by the agency to reunify the family have not been made. 42 U.S.C. 
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child's wishes either in the TPR itself88 or as a compelling reason why 
the agency does not have to file a TPR petition.289 New York considers 
the child's wishes as a compelling reason,290 but under the law, the 
agency may still choose to file a TPR petition.291 If the agency does 
choose to file a petition, the potential for adoption will not factor into the 
court's rulings during the TPR fact-finding,292 which is the only hearing 
a mentally disabled parent receives. 
Many states also consider the character of the parent-child 
relationship,293 including the record of visitation and communication294 
§ 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii) (2007). Many state laws expand on the types of situations 
that fit the "not in the best interest" category. See infra notes 289, 293-94, 298 
& 341. 
288 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(l)(B) (2007) (for children 12 years 
and older); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-l 12(j)(k) (2007) (all children); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-2353(b)(4) (2007); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 232.l 16(3)(b) (2006) 
(for children 10 and older); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (2007) (for 
children 12 and older); MD CODE ANN., FAM. LAW,§ 5-323(d)(4)(i), (iii) (2007) 
(for children of any age); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.l-283(G) (2007) (for children 14 
and older). N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(k) (McKinney 2007) states that, 
"where the child is over fourteen years of age, the court may, in its discretion, 
consider the wishes of the child in determining whether the best interests of the 
child are promoted by the commitment of guardianship and custody of the 
child"; however, the court does not actually consider best interest until the 
dispositional hearing, which does not occur in mental disability cases. 
289 See Cow. REV. STAT.§ 19-3-702(5)(a)(II) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 
32A-4-29(G)(3) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-20.1(7)(b)(5) (2007); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6-5b(b )(2) (West 2007). 
290 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(l)(ii)(C) (McKinney 2007) 
(considering whether the child is fourteen years of age or older and will not 
consent to his or her adoption). 
291 See id. § 384-b(3)(l)(i)(B). 
292 See infra note 310. 
293 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-112(j)(3)(D) (West 2007); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 232.111(2)(b)(2) (West 2007); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-
323(d)(4)(i) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(7)1 (West 2007); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.108(1) (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-
29(G)(2) (West 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.414(D)(l)-(2) (West 
2007); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-l-l 13(i)(4) (West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 
§ 5540(4) (2007). A positive parent-child relationship also is a compelling 
reason not to file a TPR in New Mexico. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(G)(2) 
(West 2007). 
294 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(l)(A) (West 2007); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 17a-l 12(k)(6)(A) (West 2007); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.447(6) 
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(even when this is not part of proving the TPR)295 and the maintenance 
of regular contact with the guardian or other custodian of the child;296 the 
potential effects on the child of severing the relationship;297 the potential 
of the child to be adopted;298 what effect a TPR would have on a sibling 
relationship,299 including whether it would substantially interfere with 
it;300 the general potential for the TPR to do more harm than good;301 and 
the child's adjustment to community, home, placement, and school.302 
Some states also allow courts to find that a TPR is not in a child's best 
interest if the parent proves by a preponderance of evidence that the 
child will not be harmed in the future, 303 or that she had good cause for 
failing to comply with the service plan;304 or because of other 
circumstances, such as a parent being committed to an institution, 
(West 2007). A record of visitation also is a compelling reason not to file a 
TPRin Colorado. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-3-702(3.5)(a), (5)(a)(I) (West 
2007). General compliance and progress with the service plan is a compelling 
reason not to file a TPR in New Mexico and Oregon. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-
4-29(G)(l) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 419B.498(2)(b)(A) (West 
2005). 
295 Cf N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(7)(b) (McKinney 2007) (providing that 
visitation and communication issues are only considered in a TPR based on 
permanent neglect, as part of the fact-finding). 
296 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ l 7a-l 12(k)(6)(B) (West 2007). 
297 Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323 (2007). 
298 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-34l(b)(3)(A)(i) (2007); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 366.26 (2007). In addition, under several state statutes, if 
adoption is not the permanency plan, but the child is otherwise in an appropriate 
placement, this can be a compelling reason for the agency to be permitted not to 
file a TPR petition. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-702(5)(a)(III) (2007). 
Another compelling reason under numerous state statutes not to file a TPR 
petition, when otherwise required, is if the child is being cared for by a relative. 
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 17a-llla (2007); Mo. REV. STAT.§ 211.447 
(2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.498 (2005). Under N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 
384-b(3)(l)(ii)(B) (McKinney 2007), New York allows an agency not to file a 
petition if the permanency goal is other than adoption. But see supra note 291; 
infra note 310. 
299 Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-323 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 215 l.4 l 4(D)(l) (2007). 
3oo CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 366.26(E) (2007). 
301 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (2007); IOWA CODE § 232.111 (2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.19b (2007); MINN. STAT. § 260C.312 (2006); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C-15.l(a)(4) (2007). 
302 Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-323 (2007). 
303 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625.090 (2007). 
304 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2007). 
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including a hospital, or if the parent's absence in the child's life is due to 
service in the armed forces. 305 Utah also forbids the court to terminate 
rights on the ground that the parent has failed to complete a treatment 
plan.306 Interestingly, Connecticut factors into best interest "the extent to 
which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful 
relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the 
other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person,"307 
which presumably includes a caseworker. 
In contrast to these states' extensive best-interest inquiries, which 
are mandated for all TPRs, courts in New York repeatedly have held that 
a dispositional hearing is not necessary for terminations based on mental 
illness or mental retardation.308 Not only is this unequal treatment for 
disabled parents, but it can, in fact, be contrary to the best interest of the 
child. This is frequently the case when adoption is a long-shot or the 
child is over the age of fourteen and does not want to be adopted. 309 
Unlike in the states discussed above, the potential of a child to be 
adopted is not part of the court's consideration during a TPR fact-finding 
in New York;310 adoptability would be considered at a dispositional 
305 IOWA CODE§ 232.1163 (e) (2006). 
306 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-407(2) (2007). 
307 CONN. GEN. STAT.§ l 7a-l 12(k)(7) (2007). 
308 See In re Henry W., 818 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Winston 
Lloyd D., 7 A.D.3d 706 (N.Y. App. Div 2004); In re Nina D., 6 A.D.3d 702 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2004); In re Guardianship of P.E.G., 2004 WL 2921862 (N.Y. 
Fam. Ct. 2004); Jn re Harry K., 270 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re 
Juliana V., 249 A.D.2d 314 (N. Y. App. Div. 1998). 
309 In New York, a young person fourteen years or older must consent to his or 
her adoption unless the court "dispenses with such consent." N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW § 1 ll(l)(a) (McKinney 2007). In the dispositional hearing following a 
TPR based on permanent neglect or severe or repeated abuse, the judge will ask 
the law guardian whether her client, if he or she is fourteen years or older, plans 
to consent to adoption. However, the potential to be adopted is not considered 
at the TPR fact-finding, infra note 310, which is the only hearing a mentally 
disabled parent receives. So, a young person with a mentally disabled parent 
can become a legal orphan, infra notes 311 and 313, solely because the grounds 
for TPR are proven, even if there is little likelihood that he or she will be 
adopted. 
310 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(3)(i) (McKinney 2007) ("[P]roof oflikelihood 
that the child will be placed for adoption shall not be required in determining 
whether the best interest of the child would be promoted by the commitment of 
the guardianship and custody of the child to an authorized agency"). This has 
been upheld in In re Peter GG., 33 A.D.3d 1104, 1105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) 
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hearing, but, again, mentally disabled parents are not entitled to these 
hearings. 
New York's lack of dispositional hearings following mental 
disability TPRs has contributed to the multitude of young people still in 
the state's foster care system (particularly adolescents) whose parents' 
rights had been terminated years ago but who never were adopted.311 
This problem of "legal orphans" also has been exacerbated by the strict 
timelines of ASFA,312 and is endemic across the country.313 In New 
("[C]ourts have terminated parental rights even though 'readoptive homes 
[have] not been found' . . . and 'there is no evidence that adoption is 
contemplated"' (internal citations omitted)). 
311 In 2005, there were 9,219 such children awaiting adoption in New York, and 
this number excludes those who were sixteen and older with a goal of discharge 
to another planned permanent living arrangement (not adoption). U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for Children & 
Families, Children in Public Foster Care Waiting to be Adopted (2007), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/waiting2005.pdf. 
The mean length of time in New York between a TPR and adoption is 19.07 
months. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Administration for 
Children & Families, Time Between TPR and Finalization (2007), 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/aN.Y.FAM.CT.ACTrs/ 
statistics/tpr_tbl4_2005.htm. New York ranks the lowest among all fifty states 
in the number of children who are adopted within twenty-four months of 
entering foster care. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
Administration for Children & Families, child welfare outcomes 2003: Annual 
report (2003), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cwo03/chapters/ 
chapterthree2003 .htm. 
312 Supra note 112. Almost all states, including New York, N.Y. Soc. SERV. 
LA w § 3 84-b(3 )(l)(i) (McKinney 2007), have adopted the fifteen out of twenty-
two month requirement into their statutes, either requiring an agency to file a 
petition when a child has been in care under this time frame, or as a ground for 
TPR, or both. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-18-5 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-
3-604; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, §§ 26, 29C; ch. 210, § 3 (2003). Some states 
have a fewer than fifteen-month requirement for a child to be in care before a 
TPR petition must be filed. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-341 (2007); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS§ 15-7-7 (1956). 
313 Since ASFA became law, there have been approximately 117,000 more 
terminations than actual adoptions. Adoptions Stall, More Legal Orphans 
Created by Failed Law, National Child Advocacy Group Says, ASCRIBE 
NEWSWIRE, http://www.ascribe.org/cgi-bin/behold.pl?ascribeid=2004 l 228.09 l 
006&time=09%2030%20PST &year=2004&public= I. In January 2005, there 
were 117,395 legal orphans nationwide. Id. Because of this problem, a study of 
legal orphans was commissioned by the federal Administration for Children & 
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York, these young people essentially have no legal recourse314 and often 
wonder why they are in limbo. 315 Sometimes their parents' behavior 
Families. us DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION 
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ABUSE, NEGLECT, ADOPTION & FOSTER CARE 
RESEARCH, TERMINATING THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF OLDER CHILDREN, 2003-
2004, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/abuse _neglect/term _rights/term _rights_ o 
verview.html#overview. See also Esther Wattenberg & Meghan Kelley, A 
Memo on Legal Orphans: Are We Creating a New Class of Children in Limbo? 
(April 30, 1999), http://ssw.che.umn.edu/img/assets/4467 I Legal_ Orphans_ 
Memo.pdf; Barbara White Stack, Law to Increase Adoptions Results in More 
Orphans, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 2005, available at 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/206256 _ orphans03.html. Some states 
have changed their laws because of the problem of legal orphans. Washington 
(House Bill 1624 added a new section to WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.215 in 
2007) and California (AB 519, enacted in 2005 to amend CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE§§ 213.5, 366.26 (2007)) now allow children to petition to reinstate their 
parents' rights. Some states also have strict statutory mandates for reviewing 
the status of a child's adoption post-TPR, and for reconsidering the TPR ifthere 
is a lack of progress. Rhode Island requires that "in the event any child, the 
parental rights to whom have been finally terminated, has not been placed by 
the agency in the home of a person or persons with the intention of adopting the 
child within thirty (30) days from the date of the final termination decree, the 
family court shall review the status of the child." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7(g) 
(1956). In D.C., the court must review the adoption every six months and can 
order change of agency for lack of progress. D.C. CODE § 16-2360(b), (e) 
(2001). 
314 Agencies are prohibited from having any contact with parents whose rights 
have been terminated. See statutes cited supra note 74. It is technically 
possible to vacate a termination of parental rights judgment under N. Y. C.P .L.R. 
5015 (2007), but this rarely happens. See Diane Riggs, Permanence Can Mean 
Going Home, ADOPTALK (Spring 2006), available at http://www.nacac.org/ 
adoptalk/permanence.html (noting that judges in New York "are not inclined to 
reverse something as serious as a TPR without irrefutable evidence that a 
child's best interests are served by the reversal"). However, this can be done 
more easily in Washington and California under new laws specific to vacating 
TPRs. See sources cited supra note 313. 
315 I have represented and spoken with hundreds of young people who are 
confused and distraught over this situation. They do not understand why their 
parents' rights were terminated in the past if they never wanted this and there 
was never a substantial likelihood that they would be adopted. At the time of 
the termination, many desired to see their parents, and they continued to do so 
in the years they remained in foster care. This includes young people with 
mentally disabled parents. One 20 year-old client of mine, who had been in 
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improves, or the parent-child relationship flourishes outside the watchful 
eye of the system, and the parents become viable resources again, 
especially as the child grows older and issues such as excessive corporal 
punishment become irrelevant.316 Aside from the emotional turmoil of 
longing to be reunified with the parent, this enduring or rekindled bond 
can have the unintended consequence of motivating a young person to 
leave the system before he or she is ready3 17 in order to be with the 
parent, because the parent cannot be a discharge resource once her rights 
have been terminated.318 There is arguably no reason, then, to terminate 
the parental rights of a child who lacks a concrete adoption plan, even if 
foster care since she was two years old, and now had four children of her own, 
maintained a relationship with her mentally disabled mother outside the system. 
Her mother provided much needed help with child care as well as financial and 
emotional support. 
316 For example, one of my former clients, whose mother's rights were 
terminated eight years earlier (prior to my representation) because of mental 
illness and drug addiction, was living in a residential treatment facility after two 
pre-adoptive placements had failed. The plan was for him to remain at the 
facility at least until he completed his high school degree and had a way of 
supporting himself. However, as he approached his eighteenth birthday, he 
began communicating with his mother again, and was insistent on discharging 
himself after his eighteenth birthday so he could have more contact with her (a 
young person in New York State can remain in foster care after his or her 
eighteenth birthday, until age 21, but must consent to do so. See N.Y. FAM. Cr. 
§ 1087(a) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 
430.12(f)(3)(c), 441.2(a)(ii)(c), 628.3(a)(l)(vii) (McKinney 2007)). In fact, my 
client's mother did not have a place for him to live, but my client was so 
frustrated with the agency's inability and refusal to plan with her, that he 
insisted on discharging himself. I encouraged him to remain in foster care until 
he had a place to live, a high school diploma, and an income. He was still in 
foster care at the time I transferred the case, but I do not know what has 
happened since. 
317 See statutes cited supra note 316. This contributes further to the problem of 
youth who are discharged from foster care without housing, education, or 
employment, which is endemic around the country. See MARTHA SHIRK & 
GARY STRANGLER, ON THEIR OWN: WHAT HAPPENS TO KIDS WHEN THEY AGE 
OUT OF FOSTER CARE (Westview Press 2004); Children Who Age Out of the 
Foster Care System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Income Security and 
Fami~v Support of the Comm. on Ways and Means, I 10th Cong. (2007) 
(testimony of Mark E. Courtney, Chapin Hall Faculty Associate); ROBERT M. 
GEORGE, ET AL., EMEPLOYMENT OUTCOMES FOR YOUTH AGING OUT OF FOSTER 
CARE (Chapin Hall Publications 2002); THE YOUTH ADVOCACY CENTER, THE 
FUTURE OF TEENS IN FOSTER CARE (2001 ). 
318 See sources cited supra note 74. 
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reunification seems far-fetched at the time the agency contemplates 
filing a TPR. As practitioners know, the long life of a child welfare case 
is unpredictable and it is often best to keep all options open.319 
New York's law also is problematic in that it does not allow for a 
suspended judgment of a TPR320 based on mental disability,321 as it does 
for TPRs based on permanent neglect322 or severe or repeated abuse.323 
Therefore, whatever the "expert" testifies to regarding a mentally 
disabled parent's abilities in the foreseeable future will have permanent 
effects; unlike non-disabled parents,324 disabled parents are never 
319 Two other clients of mine, adolescent sisters, wavered for two years over 
whether they wanted to be reunited with their mother or be adopted by their 
foster mother. However, one day I received a phone call that the sisters had 
been removed from their foster home on an emergency basis because of 
allegations of a sexual relationship between the foster mother's son and one of 
the sisters. These allegations were later shown to be unfounded; however, 
neither of the clients ever spoke to the foster mother, the person who was 
supposed to adopt them, again. At the present time, the clients are living in 
another foster home, but fervently wish to return to their mother. Stories like 
this one are extremely common in the foster care system. See, e.g., In re 
Rasheed A., G 19009/06, N.Y.L.J (8/3/07) (holding that, despite state and 
federal precedent that a parent whose rights have been terminated cannot 
subsequently seek guardianship or custody of the same child, it was proper in 
this case to award guardianship to terminated mother because of the extremely 
complicated and difficult experience and behavior of the child in his adoptive 
home, his profound attachment to his mother, and it was the only available 
avenue for permanency endorsed by the forensic psychologist for this child, 
aside from institutionalization). 
320 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(8)(t), (12) (McKinney 2007), and N.Y. FAM. 
CT. Act 633 (McKinney 2007) allow for the court, at the conclusion of the TPR, 
to grant a period of up to one year (with the possibility of a subsequent one-year 
extension) during which the judgment on the TPR is suspended, as long as the 
parent complies with court-ordered conditions. At the end of the period, if the 
parent has complied, the TPR will be dismissed. 
321 See In re Ernesto Thomas A., 5 A.D.3d 380, 381 (N.Y. 2004); In re Sarah-
Beth H., 34 A.D.3d 242 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); In re Dionne W., 267 A.D.2d 
1096 (N.Y. App. Div 1999). 
322 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§ 384-b(l2) (McKinney 2007). 
323 Id. § 384-b(8)(t). 
324 Suspended judgments are a significant possibility for respondents in 
permanent neglect and severe/repeated abuse cases. In 2005, 8.3% of TPRs in 
New York ended in suspended judgments. NEW YORK STATE Kms' WELL-
BEING INDICATORS, KWIC INDICATOR PROFILE: FOSTER CARE TPR 
JUDGMENTS: SUSPENDED JUDGMENTS, 
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granted an additional year to make improvements if the grounds for the 
TPR are weak or if it does not appear to be in the child's best interest to 
terminate rights at the time of the TPR fact-finding. 325 While no other 
states have provisions for suspended judgments, some courts have 
granted comparable time periods to allow both disabled and non-
disabled parents to reform.326 In contrast, New York's statute and case 
law regarding suspension of judgments explicitly treats disabled parents 
differently than non-disabled parents, and does not allow for 
exceptions. 327 
2. States in which Mental Disability Is Not an Express Statutory Ground 
for Termination of Parental Rights 
Seventeen states, as well as the District of Columbia,328 do not 
specify mental disability as a ground for termination, but leave it to the 
court to determine a parent's abilities given all relevant factors. 
Vermont and Minnesota are illustrative of such a viewpoint. 329 In 
Vermont, the court may consider providing financial support, being in 
regular communication, meeting the child's physical and emotional 
needs, and providing a safe environment. 330 In Minnesota, the court can 
terminate rights 
because of a consistent pattern of specific conduct ... or 
of specific conditions directly relating to the parent and 
child relationship either of which are determined by the 
court to be of a duration or nature that renders the parent 
unable, for the reasonable foreseeable future, to care 
appropriate for ... the child.331 
http://www.nyskwic.org/access_data/ind_profile.cfm?sublndicatorlD=85&go.x 
=9&go.y=l0. 
325 See cases cited supra note 321. 
326 See, e.g., In re M.R .. 2002 WL 31655025 (Minn. App. 2002) (affirming trial 
court's finding that, when all parties agreed at the scheduled TPR to postpone 
the trial for four to six months to allow mentally disabled respondent more time 
to complete her programs, this postponement was in the best interests of the 
children). 
327 Supra notes 320-22. 
328 See Appendix C. 
329 MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260C.301(1)(b)(4) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3-
504 (2006). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 712A.19b (2007). 
330 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 3-504 (2006). 
331 MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 260C.30l(l)(b)(4) (2007). 
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In these states, a mentally disabled parent's rights could be 
terminated if one or more of the statutory factors are met, but never 
simply because of the parent's disabled status. 
C. NEW YORK STATE LAW AS A PRIME EXAMPLE OF AN ADA VIOLATION 
New York's termination of parental rights statute is discriminatory 
on its face because it mandates services for non-disabled parents but not 
for disabled parents. New York's law also is discriminatory in that it 
allows a court to terminate parental rights on the basis of status; without 
services, parents with mental disabilities cannot demonstrate their 
individual capabilities, and judges therefore make decisions based on the 
mental illness instead of on the parent's individual capabilities. 
The counter-argument is that a parent's rights are terminated because 
there is "clear and convincing evidence" that the disability renders her 
unable to care for her child, and not because of her illness per se.332 But, 
as contended, the standard by which this is proven - based on the 
testimony of one expert who may interview the parent just once, and 
without review ofrecords - is not satisfactory. 
Furthermore, the lack of a dispositional hearing (and the possibility 
of a suspended judgment) following a mental illness termination is both 
discriminatory and potentially against the best interest of the child. 
III. A CALL FOR CHANGE IN STATUTES AND PRACTICE, BASED ON 
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE ADA 
Some states have incorporated the principles of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act into their statutes and case law, but more can be 
accomplished by state legislatures and judiciaries, as well as by arguably 
the most influential arm of child welfare - the agencies and their 
caseworkers. The caseworker is the one, after all, who is most involved 
in the daily life of a family; lawyers and judges are often unaware of the 
intricacies and difficulties of a case until a court appearance. 333 
Numerous scholars and practitioners have noted that court proceedings 
332 N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b(4)(c) (McKinney 2007) was held 
constitutional for this reason in In re Nereida S., 454 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. 1982). 
333See Jennifer Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical 
Evaluation of the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of 
Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1251, 1281 n.164 (1996). 
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are often ineffective for addressing a family's needs and for holding the 
agency to its mandate.334 
One state, Arkansas, has actually written the Americans with 
Disabilities Act into its child welfare statute.335 A court can only 
terminate parental rights after it has found, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that "despite a meaningful effort ... to rehabilitate the parent 
and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have not 
been remedied by the parent,"336 provided, however, that "[t]he 
department shall make reasonable accommodations in accordance with 
the Americans with Disabilities Act .... to parents with disabilities in 
order to allow them meaningful access to reunification and family 
preservation services. "337 Other state statutes, although making no 
reference to the ADA, explicitly require that reunification services be 
appropriate,338 accessible,339 and realistic340 to the needs of parents.341 
In addition, Idaho's TPR statute provides that, if the parent "has a 
disability, the parent shall have a right to provide evidence to the court 
regarding the manner in which adaptive equipment or supportive 
services will enable the parent to carry out parenting responsibilities." 342 
This right is limited, however, by what follows: "Nothing in this section 
334 Id. at 1281 ("Indeed, more than one commentator has suggested that some 
judges "'rubber stamp" reasonable efforts' on cases without insisting that the 
agency meet its burden"). 
335 ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27-34l(b)(l)(B)(vii)(b) (2007). 
336 Id.§ 9-27-341(b)(l)(B)(i)(a). 
337 Id. § (b)(l)(B)(vii)(b) (internal citations omitted). 
338 325 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/8.2 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 169-C:24-a 
111.(c) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 26-8A-21 (2007). 
339 MINN. STAT.§ 260.012(h)(2), (4), (6) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT.§ 169-C:24-a 
III(c). 
340 MINN. STAT. § 260.012(h)(2), (4), (6). 
341 Under numerous state statutes, another compelling reason to refrain from 
filing a petition to terminate rights arises if the parent has not been afforded 
reasonable opportunity to avail herself of services, or services had not been 
provided to her. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 26-18-5(b)(3) (2007); ALASKA 
STAT. § 47.10.088(e)(2) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604 (2007); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 17a-llla(b) (2007); D.C. CODE § 16-2354(g)(3) (2007); FLA. 
STAT. § 39.8055(2)(b)(5) (2007); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405/2-23 (2007), 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT.§ 50/1 (2007); IND. CODE§ 31-35-2-4.5 (2007). This also is a 
compelling reason for an agency not to file a petition under ASFA, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 675(5) (2006). 
342 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2005(6) (2007). 
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shall be construed to create any new or additional obligation on state or 
local governments to purchase or provide adaptive equipment or 
supportive services for parents with disabilities."343 This provision 
seems to hint at the fundamental alteration defense available to states in 
ADA claims,344 but without the strict guidance of the federal law, which 
requires a balancing test to determine when reasonable accommodations 
must be made for the disabled. 345 Still, the Idaho statute at least 
acknowledges the existence of disabled parents and the need to examine 
reasonable accommodations at TPRs. Moreover, the case law in some 
other states indicates an acknowledgment of the need to treat disabled 
parents equitably-providing services where non-disabled parents 
receive them,346 and ensuring that such services are tailored so they have 
a chance to prove themselves. 347 
343 Id. 
344 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2007). 
345 Supra note 155. 
346 In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d 301 (R.I. 2003); In re Welfare of S.Z., 547 
N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1996); In re Welfare ofK.D.W., No. Co-91-155, 1991 WL 
151349 (Minn. Ct. App. August 13, 1991); In re Chapman, 631 P.2d 831 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1981). 
347In re Christopher B., 823 A.2d at 313 ("[W]e hold that [the agency], in 
petitioning for a TPR decree on mental-deficiency grounds, was required to 
demonstrate that it undertook reasonable efforts to address these mental-
deficiency issues in the services it offered to this parent ... reasonable efforts to 
reunify a family must in some way include an offer of services that would be 
reasonable under the particular circumstances of each given case-taking into 
account the particular needs of the subject family-including the mental 
deficiency of a parent"); In re Welfare of the Children of M.R., No. C4-02-446, 
2002 WL 31655025 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2002) ("Generally, for services 
to be 'reasonable,' the responsible agency must provide services that would 
assist in alleviating the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement"); In re 
Welfare of D.F., No. C0-97-461, 1997 WL 407799 (Minn. Ct. App. July 22, 
1997) (stating that it is necessary to assess whether services go beyond mere 
logistics, such as scheduling of appointments, to provide genuine assistance that 
might conceivably improve the circumstances of the parent and the relationship 
of the parent with the child.); In re C.P.B., 641 S.W.2d 456 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) 
(stating reunification plan must make clear what criteria would be applied to 
determine compliance). See also In re Dependency of H.W., 961 P.2d 963 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1998); In re Custody and Parental Rights of M.M., 894 P.2d 
298 (Mont. 1995); In re Victoria M., 255 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In 
re D.L.S., 432 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1988); In re Welfare of B.L.W., 395 N.W.2d 
426 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); In re S.P.W., 707 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); 
In re M.L.W., 452 A.2d 1021 (Pa. Super. Ct.1982); In re C.M.E., 448 A.2d 59 
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Even some New York courts have reached the conclusion that 
mentally disabled parents must be treated equitably, independent of state 
or federal mandates.348 Before ASFA and the ADA, the court in In re 
Catholic Guardian Society of the Diocese of Brooklyn denied a mental 
illness termination because of an agency's failure to engage in diligent 
efforts with a mentally retarded parent. 349 "The failure of petitioner to 
make diligent efforts .. .is critical, not because Social Services Law 
Section 3 84-b( 4 )( c) contains a diligent efforts mandate, but because [this 
failure makes it] difficult if not impossible to assess the foreseeable 
future parental capacity of the respondent. It could be said that the 
question of diligent efforts is but one issue that is subsumed within the 
more general mandate in SSL Section 384-b(4)(c) to demonstrate ... what 
the respondent's adaptation will be in the 'foreseeable future. "'350 The 
Court of Appeals In re Joyce T.W. Burton Richardson,. also held that 
"termination [for mental illness] requires a ... consideration of measures 
on the part of the State to maintain the family setting."351 
But New York and other states can do more about what the courts 
often acknowledge is an unfair and "painful"352 process for mentally 
disabled parents. In In re Henry W, a New York court reluctantly 
terminated the parental rights of a mildly retarded father who held a job 
and acquired a home, not because of any "wrong doing or fault on [the 
parent's] part" but because a psychologist, who performed two 
evaluations of the father, concluded that he could not parent the child 
independently.353 Similarly, in In re Ashley L., the respondent mother 
showed "substantial improvements in her ability to tolerate stress, take 
her medications and cooperate in treatment." but the TPR was granted; 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Kerr, supra note 230, at 415 (emphasizing the importance 
of tailored services). 
348 In In re Dependency of WW Children, the court actually rejected the 
agency's position that it could determine that a mentally retarded parent was 
unable to care for her children in the foreseeable future without providing 
services, because even though "a reading of [N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW] § 384-b 
(4)(c) clearly shows that ... the legislature does not mandate a showing of 
diligent efforts by the agency, it does not in any way preclude such a showing." 
736 N.Y.S.2d 567, 576 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2001). See also In re Viana Children, 
476 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984). 
349 499 N.Y.S.2d 587 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1986). 
350 Id. at 596. 
351 65- N.Y.2d 39, 48 (N.Y. 1985). 
352 In re Henry W., 818 N.Y.S.2d at 351. 
353 Id. 
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354 in In re Antonio, the respondent mother's rights were terminated, 
despite the fact that she had completed her service plan and was seeing a 
psychiatrist weekly, because of the court-appointed psychologist's 
testimony, which was based on a single interview.355 
New York and other states could avoid these heart-wrenching 
decisions by following the lead of some other states, which have found 
innovative ways to avoid or mitigate the permanency of a TPR while still 
providing the child of a mentally disabled parent with stability: In West 
Virginia, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a TPR only after the 
agency arranged a post-TPR visitation plan with the respondent parent, 
and it instructed the lower courts to consider this option in future 
cases.356 Similarly, in Nebraska, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to 
enter orders following the termination of a parent's rights which are 
consistent with the best interests of the children, including provision for 
continued contact with a natural parent. 357 Massachusetts has held 
likewise, and also allows a TPR order to be modified if there are 
changed circumstances post-trial, including when an adoption is no 
longer feasible. 358 Also, as discussed, because of the epidemic of legal 
orphans, some states now allow young people to petition to vacate their 
parents' TPRs,359 although this is a band-aid, not a solution, to 
problematic court findings. 
Alternative living arrangements also can be utilized for children with 
mentally disabled parents, where appropriate. In Delaware, a court 
rejected a TPR in favor of an alternative planned permanent living 
arrangement where the 14 year-old child had thriving relationships with 
both her foster mother and her natural mother, and where the mentally 
disabled respondent mother had been providing assistance to the foster 
parent with the child's transportation and other needs.36° Cases like this 
one illustrate the possibility of agreements, whether in or out of court, 
that can be made between biological and foster parents. These 
arrangements are especially important for mentally disabled parents, 
354 22 A.D.3d 915 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
355 26 A.D.3d 332, 333 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
356 In re Daniel D., 562 S.E.2d 147, 160-61 (W. Va. 2002). 
357 In re Stacey D., 684 N.W.2d 594, 603 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004). 
358 In re Adoption of Cesar, 856 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). 
359 Supra note 313. 
360 In re Division ofFamily Services, 2003 WL 22265071 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003). 
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many of whom can be primary caretakers if they receive support,361 or 
who can provide assistance to another caretaker. A solution of this kind 
may have been possible with Tanya, who had a strong reciprocal bond 
with her daughter as well as an amiable relationship with the foster 
mother. Terminating Tanya's rights may not have been necessary, if an 
alternative were available which allowed all of the people in Gaby's life 
to work together. 
In fact, thirty-nine states have legalized a crucial alternative: 
subsidized guardianship.362 Subsidized guardianship provides relatives 
and other caregivers the opportunity to become permanent legal 
guardians for children when neither returning the child to the disabled 
parent's home nor adoption is appropriate.363 Some states even allow 
this alternative to be ordered at the conclusion of a TPR, instead of 
terminating parental rights, even when the grounds for termination are 
proven.364 But New York is not such a state,365 having failed to enact 
361 Supra notes 103, 148, and 281-82; see also In re Eden F., 741 A.2d 873, 892 
(Conn. 1999) (holding that a parent does not have to prove that she is able to 
assume full responsibility for her child, unaided by available support systems, to 
avoid a TPR). 
362 CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, STATES' SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP LAWS AT 
A GLANCE (2004), 
http://www.childrensdefense.org/ site/DocServer/ guardianship_ laws. pdf? doc ID= 
544. 
363 
"Some . . . caregivers choose not to adopt because they do not want to 
permanently alter family relationships or remain hopeful that the child's parents 
will address their problems and be able to resume caring for the child. 
Sometimes older children do not want to be adopted and sever legal ties to their 
parents, even though they wish to live permanently with a relative. In some 
cultures, terminating parental rights is contrary to cultural norms that value 
extended family and mutual interdependence." Id. States subsidize 
guardianship through a variety of local, state, and federal funding sources. The 
programs vary significantly, but the universal goal is to provide permanency for 
children by preventing them from entering, or enabling them to exit, state 
custody, without severing parental rights. Id. Most states (31) require that the 
child be in state care prior to receiving the subsidy, although the majority do not 
specify a minimum time length. Id. 
364 In Kansas, the court may award permanent guardianship at the end of a TPR 
proceeding, even if the grounds were proven, in lieu of granting TPR. KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-2272 (2006). The same is true in Mississippi, although 
Mississippi's guardianship is not subsidized. Mrss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103 
(2007). If a child is being cared for by a relative, this also is a compelling 
reason for an agency not to file a TPR under ASF A and many state statutes. 
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subsidized guardianship legislation in 1996366 and again in 1997. 367 New 
York does have post-adoption agreements, which are now legally 
enforceable as contracts if they are part of the original adoption order. 368 
But a parent still has to surrender her rights (and many, like Tanya, are 
unwilling to do so), or those rights must be terminated, which, as 
discussed, can be psychologically traumatic for both parent and child, 
and against the child's best interest. 
It is time to reform the black-and-white decision-making process 
behind too many TPRs, and to protect both the rights of mentally 
disabled parents and the interests of their children, consistent with the 
mandates and guidance of the ADA. New York and other states' laws 
should be reformed so that all parents receive services, that these 
services are tailored and accommodating, and that all TPR 
determinations are based on a comprehensive examination of a parent's 
abilities, as demonstrated through fulfillment of a sound service plan. 
But aside from, and perhaps more important than, legal reform, it is time 
for agencies, lawyers, and judges to be more flexible and fluid in their 
decision-making, allowing children to maintain all of the important 
Supra note 290. But this does not necessarily result in permanency or release 
from the foster care system; it only means that parental rights will not be 
terminated. In order to exit the foster care system, guardianship or custody must 
transfer from the state to the relative or another adult in the child's life. 
365 Supra note 362. 
366 In 1996, Congress passed an amendment to the Social Security Act offering 
states the option to apply for a waiver allowing them to continue receiving 
federal funding for children in child protective proceedings while testing 
alternative approaches for kinship care. NEW YORK SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP 
(Generations United, Washington D.C.), available at http://ipath.gu.org/ 
documents/ AO/GU_ NY.pdf. New York did not submit an application for a 
waiver. Id. Waivers to the Social Security Act still are available, although New 
York has yet to apply. Supra note 362. Funding is also available from other 
federal sources, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (T ANF) 
program funds, and Title XX Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) Funds. Id. 
367 In 1997, when ASFA was enacted, many states established subsidized 
guardianship as a permanency option for children in kinship care. New York 
did not do so. NEW YORK SUBSIDIZED GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 369. Ever 
since, there has been a movement in New York urging state officials to pass 
legislation that supports "subsidized kinship guardianship," but no such law has 
passed. FEDERATION OF PROTESTANT AGENCIES, INC., SUBSIDIZED KINSHIP 
GUARDIANSHIP: IT'S TIME (2002). 
368 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §112-b (2006). See also Ronald D., Sr. v. Doe, 673 
N.Y.S.2d 559, 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). 
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relationships in their lives when appropriate. No one is an island, 
especially not a child. Why strand a young person when we can at least 
consider building and strengthening his bridges? 
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Appendix A 
STATE COURT DECISIONS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ADA 
TO TPRs AND THE USE OF THE ADA AS A DEFENSE AT TPRs 
States that have applied the ADA to IA, KS, MT, WA TPRs 
States that have acknowledged the AK, AR, IN, MI, NM 
relevance of the ADA to TPRs 
States holding that services must be 
non-discriminatory, despite finding VT 
that the ADA is not applicable to 
TPRs 
States holding that an ADA violation 
can be raised in a child protective IA, MA, NY proceeding, but must be done prior 
toTPR 
State holding that TPRs are not CA, CT, LA, MA, MI, NY, 
"services, programs, or activities" RI, VT 
under the ADA 
States holding that the ADA IS FL, VT, WI 
unrelated to TPRs 
States holding that a dismissal of a AR, CA, CO, CT, FL, HI, 
TPR is not a remedy for an ADA IN, MA, MI, MO, NY, OH, 
violation PA, TXVT, WI 
States holding that parents must 
raise ADA violations m separate CA, CT, HI, MA, NY, OH, 
lawsuits or procedures according to VT,WI 
the ADA 
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Appendix B 
REUNIFICATION SERVICES FOR MENTALLY DISABLED PARENTS: 
30 STATES REQUIRING SERVICES 20 STATES NOT REQUIRING 
{AND DC) SERVICES 
State Statute State Statute 
Alabama ALA. CODE § 26-18- Alaska ALASKA 
7(a)(6) (2007) STATE 
§ 47.10.086 
(c)(5) (2006) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27- Arizona ARIZ. REV. 
341 (b )(3)(B)(i)(a)-(b) STAT.ANN. 
(Supp. 2007) § 8-
846(B )( 1 )(b) 
(2007) 
Delaware DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, California CAL. WELF. 
§ 1103(d) (2006) &INST. 
CODE 
§ 361.5(c) 
(West 2007) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11- Colorado COLO.REV. 
58 (2006) STAT.§ 19-
3-604( 1 )(b) 
(2007) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT.§ 587- Connec- CONN.GEN. 
26 (2006) ti cut STAT. 
§ 17a-l 12U) 
(2006) 
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Idaho JD AHO CODE ANN. § 16- Florida FLA. STAT. 
1621 (2007) ANN. 
§ 39.8055(1) 
(d) (West 
2006) 
Illinois 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. Kentucky KY.REV. 
505/5(1) (2007); 325 ILL. STAT.ANN. 
COMP. STAT. 5/8.2 § 610.127(6) 
(2007) (West 2007) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN.§ 31-34- Maine ME.REV. 
21-5.5 (West 2007) STAT.ANN. 
tit. 22, 
§ 4041(2) 
(A-2)(1)-(2) 
(2007) 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 232.102( 5) Massach- MASS.GEN. 
(2007) usetts LAWS ch. 
119, § 29C 
(2007) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38- Minnesota MINN. STAT. 
2269(b )(7) (2006) § 260.012(a) 
(5) (2007) 
Louisiana LA. CHILD CODE ANN. Montana MONT.CODE 
art. 675(B)(2) (2003) ANN.§ 41-3-
609(4)(B) 
(2005) 
Maryland Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. Nevada NEV.REV. 
LAW§ 5-524 (West STAT. 
2007) § 432B.550 
(6)(a)(2) 
(2005) 
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Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS New N.M.STAT. 
§ 712A.18f(2007) Mexico § 32A-4-
28(B)(2) 
(2007) 
Mississ- MISS. CODE ANN. § 43- New York N.Y. Soc. 
ippi 21-609(t)(iii) (2007) SERV.LAW 
§ 384-b(4)(c) 
(McKinney 
2007) 
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT. North N.C.GEN. 
§ 211.183 (West 2007) Carolina STAT.§ 7B-
507(b)(l) 
(2007) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 43- South S.C.CODE 
283.01 (2006) Carolina ANN.§ 20-7-
1572 (2006) 
New N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. Utah UTAH CODE 
Hamp- § 169-C:24-a(III)( c) ANN. 
shire (West 2007) § 78-3a-
311(3)(d)(i) 
(B) (2007) 
New N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C- Vermont VT. STAT. 
Jersey 11.3 (West 2007) ANN. tit. 33, 
§ 5515(±) 
(2006) 
North N.D. CENT. CODE § 27- West W.VA. 
Dakota 20-32.2 (2005) Virginia CODE§ 49-
6-5(b)(6) 
(2006) 
Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN. Wyoming WYO.STAT. 
§ 2151.419 (West 2007) ANN.§ 14-2-
309(c)(iii) 
(2007) 
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Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, 
§ 7003-4.6 (2007) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT. 
& 419B.340 (2005) 
Pennsylvania 42 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN.§ 6351(b)(2) 
(West 2006) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-
7-7 (2006) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 26-8A-21 (2007) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 37-1-166 (2006) 
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN.§ 161.003(a)(4) 
(Vernon 2007) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16.1-283(B)(2) 
(2007) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 13.34.132 (2007) 
Washington, D.C. CODE § 4-
DC 1301.09a (2007) 
Wisconsin WIS. ANN. STAT. 
§ 48.355 (West 2006) 
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Appendix C 
MENTALLY DISABILITY AS GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION 
33 STATES WITH (INCLUDING WI) 17 STATES (AND DC) WITHOUT 
State Statute State Statute 
ALA. CODE § 26- CONN.GEN. Alabama Connecticut STAT.§ 45a-715 18-7 (2007) (2007) 
ALASKA STAT. FLA. STAT. Alaska § 47.10.011 Florida § 39.802 (2007) (2006) 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. IDAHOCODE 
Arizona ANN.§ 8-533 Idaho ANN.§ 16-1624 
(2007) (2007) 
ARK. CODE ANN. IND. CODE ANN. Arkansas § 9-27-341 (2007) Indiana §31-35-2-4 (2007) 
CAL. FAM. CODE LA. CHILD. 
California § 7826 Louisiana CODE ANN. art. 
(West 2007) 1015(2006) 
COLO. REV. ME. REV. STAT. 
Colorado STAT.§ 19-3-604 Maine ANN. tit. 22, 
(2007) § 4055 (2007) 
DEL. CODE ANN. MICH. COMP. 
Delaware tit.13,§ 1103 Michigan LAWS § 712A.19b (2006) (2007) 
GA. CODE ANN. MINN. STAT. 
Georgia § 15-11-94 Minnesota § 260C.301 
(2006) (2007) 
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HAW. REV. STAT. N.J. STAT. ANN. Hawaii § 571-61 (2006) New Jersey § 30:4C-15.l (2007) 
705 ILL. COMP. N.M. STAT. 
Illinois STAT. 405/2-3 New Mexico § 32A-4-28 
(2007) (2007) 
IOWACODE North N.D.CENT. Iowa § 232.116 (2007) Dakota CODE§ 27-20-20.1 (2005) 
23 PA. CONS. 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN. Pennsylvania STAT.ANN. § 38-2269 (2006) § 2511 
(West2006) 
KY. REV. STAT. R.I. GEN. LAWS Kentucky ANN.§ 610.127 Rhode Island § 15-7-7(2006) (West 2007) 
MD. CODE ANN., South S.D. CODIFIED Maryland FAM. LAW§ 5- Dakota LAWS § 26-8A-523 (West 2007) 26 (2007) 
MASS. GEN. TENN.CODE 
Massachusetts LAWS CH. 119, Tennessee ANN.§ 37-1-147 
& 24 (2007) (2006} 
MISS. CODE ANN. VT. STAT. ANN. 
Mississippi § 93-15-103 Vermont tit. 15A, § 3-504 
(2007) (2006) 
Mo. ANN. STAT. Washington, D.C. CODE§ 16-
Missouri § 211.447 (West 
2007) DC 2353 (2007) 
MONT. CODE WYO. STAT. 
Montana ANN.§ 41-3-609 Wyoming ANN.§ 14-3-431 
(2005) (2007) 
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Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (2006) 
NEV. REV. STAT. 
Nevada ANN.§ 128.106 
(West 2007) 
New N.H. REV. STAT. 
Hampshire § 170-C:5 (2007) 
N.Y. Soc. SERV. 
New York LAW§ 384-b 
(McKinney 2007) 
North N.C. GEN. STAT. 
Carolina ANN.§ 7B-1111 (West 2007) 
OHIO REV. CODE 
Ohio ANN.§ 2151.353 
(West 2007) 
OKLA. STAT. 
Oklahoma ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1 
(West 2007) 
OR. REV. STAT. 
Oregon § 419B.504 
(2006) 
South S.C. CODE ANN. 
Carolina § 20-7-1572 (2006) 
TEX. FAM. CODE 
Texas ANN.§ 161.003 
(Vernon 2007) 
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UTAH CODE 
Utah ANN.§ 78-3a-408 
(2007) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. & 16.1-283 (2007) 
WASH.REV. 
Washington CODE § 13.34.180 
(2007) 
West Virginia W. VA.CODE & 49-6-5 (2006) 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 
Wisconsin § 48.415 
(West 2006) 
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Appendix D 
STATES THAT CONTEMPLATE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
SIMULTANEOUSLY AS TPR (EVERY STATE EXCEPT NEW YORK) 
State Statute 
Alabama ALA. CODE & 26-18-7 (2006) 
Alaska ALASKA STAT.§ 47.10.088 (2006) 
Arizona ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-533 (2007) 
Arkansas ARK. CODE ANN.§ 9-27-341 (2007) 
California CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE§ 366.26 (2007) 
Colorado COLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-3-602 (2007) 
Connecticut CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 45A-715 (2007) 
Delaware 13 DEL. CODE ANN. & 1103 (2006) 
Florida FLA. STAT. & 39.802 (2007) 
Georgia GA. CODE ANN.§ 15-11-94 (2006) 
Hawaii HAW. REV. STAT.§ 571-61 (2006) 
Idaho IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1624 (2007) 
Illinois 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-21 (2007) 
Indiana IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4 (2007) 
Iowa IOWA CODE § 232.111 (2007) 
Kansas KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 38-2365 (2006) 
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Kentucky KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 625.050 (West 2006) 
Louisiana LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1015 (2006) 
Maine ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4055 (2007) 
Maryland MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW§ 5-337 (West2007) 
Massachusetts MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 119, § 29C (2007) 
Michigan MICH. COMP. LAWS § 7 l 2A.19b (2007) 
Minnesota MINN. STAT.§ 260C.301 (2007) 
Mississippi MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-15-103 (2007) 
Missouri Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 211.452 (West 2007) 
Montana MONT. CODE ANN.§ 41-3-604 (2005) 
Nebraska NEB. REV. STAT.§ 42-292 (2006) 
Nevada NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 128.105 (WEST 2006) 
New Hampshire N.H. REV. STAT.§ 169-C:24 (2007) 
New Jersey N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 30:4C-15.l (2007) 
New Mexico N.M. STAT.§ 32A-4-28 (2007) 
North Carolina N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 7B-l 104 (West 2007) 
North Dakota N.D. CENT. CODE§ 27-20-20.l (2005) 
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Ohio OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2151.414 (West 2007) 
Oklahoma OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7006-1.1 (West2007) 
Oregon OR. REV. STAT.§ 419B.500 (2005) 
Pennsylvania 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. & 2511 (West 2007) 
Rhode Island R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-7-7 (2006) 
South Carolina S.C. CODE ANN.§ 20-7-768 (2006) 
South Dakota S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 26-8A-26 (2007) 
Tennessee TENN. CODE ANN.§ 37-1-147 (2006) 
Texas TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.§ 161.003 (Vernon 2007) 
Utah UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-4A-203.5 (2007) 
Vermont VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-504 (2007) 
Virginia VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-283 (2007) 
Washington WASH. REV. CODE & 13.34.132 (2007) 
Washington, DC D.C. CODE & 16-2353 (2007) 
West Virginia W. VA. CODE§ 49-6-5b (2006) 
Wisconsin WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.417 (West 2006) 
Wyoming WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 14-3-431 (2007) 
